Human freedom and enhancement

Heilinger, Jan-Christoph; Crone, Katja

doi:10.1007/s11019-013-9479-z

Cited by 8 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…36–37). Moreover, enhancing mental abilities related to executive functions could improve self‐determination and the freedom of will (Heilinger and Crone, 2014, p. 15). Therefore, if genetic cognitive enhancement is possible in the future, it can lead to procedural autonomy enhancement.…”

Section: Autonomy Enhancement Through Reprogenetic Technologiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

From Self‐Determination to Offspring‐Determination? Reproductive Autonomy, Procrustean Parenting, and Genetic Enhancement

Rueda

2021

Theoria

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Emerging reprogenetic technologies may radically change how humans reproduce in the not-so-distant future. One foreseeable consequence of disruptive innovations in the procreative domain is an increase in the reproductive autonomy of intended parents. Regarding the prospective parental liberty of enhancing non-health-related traits of the offspring, one controversy has particularly dominated the literature. Does parents' choice of genetically enhancing the traits of their descendants compromise children's future personal autonomy? In this article, I will analyse the main arguments which posit that reprogenetic enhancement could be at odds with the child's future autonomy. I will argue that these objections are ill-founded. Moreover, I will present other arguments that show that reprogenetic technologies can enhance the autonomy of future children. Autonomy enhancement is a plausible and pro tanto desirable application of emerging reprogenetic technologies.

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Section: Autonomy Enhancement Through Reprogenetic Technologiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

From Self‐Determination to Offspring‐Determination? Reproductive Autonomy, Procrustean Parenting, and Genetic Enhancement

Rueda

2021

Theoria

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“…In this view, enhancements can be understood as '' [an] improvement relative to the present state of affairs, [which] aims to remove or repair human flaws without prejudgment about what is 'ideal' or perfectly human'' (Mahootian 2012, p. 143). In framing enhancement in this manner, as something not intrinsically linked to any particular ideal, this definition might also be presented as acceptable in a liberal pluralistic society (Heilinger & Crone 2013).…”

Section: Two Ways Of Looking At Improvement: Backward and Forwardmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evaluating human enhancements: the importance of ideals

Roduit

Baumann

Heilinger

2014

Monash Bioeth. Rev.

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Is it necessary to have an ideal of perfection in mind to identify and evaluate true biotechnological human "enhancements", or can one do without? To answer this question we suggest employing the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory, found in the debate in political philosophy about theories of justice: the distinctive views about whether one needs an idea of a perfectly just society or not when it comes to assessing the current situation and recommending steps to increase justice. In this paper we argue that evaluating human enhancements from a non-ideal perspective has some serious shortcomings, which can be avoided when endorsing an ideal approach. Our argument starts from a definition of human enhancement as improvement, which can be understood in two ways. The first approach is backward-looking and assesses improvements with regard to a status quo ante. The second, a forward-looking approach, evaluates improvements with regard to their proximity to a goal or according to an ideal. After outlining the limitations of an exclusively backward-looking view (non-ideal theory), we answer possible objections against a forward-looking view (ideal theory). Ultimately, we argue that the human enhancement debate would lack some important moral insights if a forward-looking view of improvement is not taken into consideration.

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“…Autonomy plays an important role in common morality and in moral philosophy (see, e.g., Beauchamp and Childress 2013) and questions related to autonomy have already gathered a significant amount of attention in the moral philosophical literature on human enhancement (see, e.g., Heilinger and Crone 2014;Juth 2011;Pömsl and Friedrich 2017;Schaefer et al 2014). Yet whether self-validating neuroenhancement-neuroenhancement in which an individual's endorsement of her new self is caused by the enhancement process she underwent-can be autonomous would not appear to have received due consideration.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Can self-validating neuroenhancement be autonomous?

Varelius

2019

Med Health Care and Philos

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Consider that an individual improves her capacities by neuroscientific means. It turns out that, besides altering her in the way(s) she intended, the enhancement also changes her personality in significant way(s) she did not foresee. Yet the person endorses her new self because the neuroenhancement she underwent changed her. Can the person's approval of her new personality be autonomous? While questions of autonomy have already gathered a significant amount of attention in philosophical literature on human enhancement, the problem just described-henceforth referred to as the question whether selfvalidating neuroenhancement can be autonomous-would not appear to have received due consideration. This article takes a step towards remedying the shortage. I start by explicating the main points of departure of its argument. In the subsequent sections of the article, I consider several possible reasons for deeming self-validating neuroenhancement incompatible with autonomy. On the basis of the consideration, I propose that self-validating neuroenhancement can be autonomous.

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Human freedom and enhancement

Cited by 8 publications

References 20 publications

From Self‐Determination to Offspring‐Determination? Reproductive Autonomy, Procrustean Parenting, and Genetic Enhancement

From Self‐Determination to Offspring‐Determination? Reproductive Autonomy, Procrustean Parenting, and Genetic Enhancement

Evaluating human enhancements: the importance of ideals

Can self-validating neuroenhancement be autonomous?

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