Human Performance Challenges for the Future Force: Lessons from Patriot after the Second Gulf War

Hawley, John K.; Mares, Anna L.

doi:10.1201/9781315576756-1

Cited by 6 publications

(9 citation statements)

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“…Control of increasingly advanced and automated technology often requires greater understanding, training, and proficiency -not less. The Army Research Laboratory's reporting on the fratricide incidents recommended that the Army re-examine the level of expertise required to employ weapon systems like the Patriot on the modern battlefield and invoked the concept of "training for expertise" rather than just training (Hawley and Mares 2012). Not unlike the development of genuine expertise with other complex systems, Patriot crews could perform their missions effectively only after considerable practice in difficult and challenging situations (Hoffman et al 2014).…”

Section: Problems With the Patriotmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…After the two incidents and the tragic loss of three lives, senior Army commanders expressed their concern over the apparent "lack of vigilance" on the part of Patriot crewmembers along with the "unwarranted trust in automation" and apparent "lack of cognizance" of what the system displayed to Patriot crews (Hawley and Mares 2012). To the commanders, the operators of the system were primarily responsible for the incidents, but an investigation by the Army Research Lab revealed other causes:…”

Section: Problems With the Patriotmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…Less than a month after shooting down the British fighter aircraft, a Patriot system generated indications of a ballistic missile attack because of radar interference. Responding to those indications, the tactical director ordered his crew to "bring your launchers to ready" (Hawley and Mares 2012). The director wanted his crew to prepare for a potential response, but his crew changed the status of the system from a "standby" to a "ready" status instead, which allowed the automatic mode of the system to launch a missile against the indications of the incoming ballistic missile.…”

Section: Problems With the Patriotmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

The myths and costs of autonomous weapon systems

Hoffman¹,

Cullen

Hawley

2016

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

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Section: Problems With the Patriotmentioning

confidence: 98%

Section: Problems With the Patriotmentioning

confidence: 98%

Section: Problems With the Patriotmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

The myths and costs of autonomous weapon systems

Hoffman¹,

Cullen

Hawley

2016

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

Self Cite

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“…It has become meaningless because the decision-making capacities of operators do not fulfil prerequisite conditions for MHC derived from literature on human factor analysis: a functional understanding of how the targeting systems 'make' decisions, sufficient situational understanding and the capacity to scrutinise machine 'decision-making' (e.g. Hawley and Mares, 2012). The following sections examine how states performing practices in relation to ADS integrating autonomous technologies have shaped this diminished quality of human control as normatively 'appropriate' and normal at sites outside of the public eye.…”

Section: How Normativity/normality Emerges In Practices: Ads and Huma...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This has increased system complexity . For example, the US Army’s Patriot system alone runs on ‘more than 3.5 million lines of software code’ and is designed to be operated with other, even more complex ADS, such as the ship-bound AEGIS (Hawley and Mares, 2012: 4). This networked, multi-tiered cooperation between systems is typical for how ADS are designed to be used (Mizroch, 2012).…”

Section: How Normativity/normality Emerges In Practices: Ads and Huma...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Practice-based and public-deliberative normativity: retaining human control over the use of force

Bode

2023

European Journal of International Relations

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The debate about lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) characterises them as future problems in need of pre-emptive regulation, for example, through codifying meaningful human control. But autonomous technologies are already part of weapons and have shaped how states think about human control. To understand this normative space, I proceed in two steps: first, I theorise how practices of designing, of training personnel for, and of operating weapon systems integrating autonomous technologies have shaped normativity/normality on human control at sites unseen. Second, I trace how this normativity/normality interacts with public deliberations at the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on LAWS by theorising potential dynamics of interaction. I find that the normativity/normality emerging from practices performed in relation to weapon systems integrating autonomous technologies assigns humans a reduced role in specific use of force decisions and understands this diminished decision-making capacity as ‘appropriate’ and ‘normal’. In the public-deliberative process, stakeholders have interacted with this normativity by ignoring it, engaging in distancing or positively acknowledging it – rather than scrutinising it. These arguments move beyond prioritising public deliberation in norm research towards exploring practices performed at sites outside of the public eye as productive of normativity. I theorise this process via international practice theories, critical security studies and Science and Technology scholarship to draw out how practices shape normativity, presenting ideas of oughtness and justice, and normality, making something appear normal via collective, repeated performances.

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Prospects for the global governance of autonomous weapons: comparing Chinese, Russian, and US practices

et al. 2023

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Kallenborn, 2021). The CEO of the system's manufacturer STM maintains that the use of autonomy in the Kargu-2 is primarily restricted to navigation, and that "[u]nless an operator pushes the button, it is not possible for the drone to select a target and attack" (Tavsan, 2021). Despite this ambiguity, the incident has been widely portrayed as the first battlefield use of autonomous weapon systems (AWS), often colloquially called "killer robots" (see Mizokami, 2021;Stanley, 2021;Vincent, 2021).AWS are defined as "any weapons that select and apply force to targets without human intervention" (ICRC, 2022). 1 Militaries throughout the world have demonstrated 1 In this article we generally refer to autonomous weapon systems (AWS). AWS are not a specific category of weapon. Rather, we understand AWS as being any type of weapon system which utilizes machine autonomy to select and apply force without immediate human control or intervention. While some autonomous weapons integrate AI elements into their critical functions, they may not all necessarily be based on AI technologies. We will only employ the term lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) when specifically citing the discussion at the UN CCW, as this is the official term which states parties have used as part of this debate. The term "killer robots" is also commonly

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Human Performance Challenges for the Future Force: Lessons from Patriot after the Second Gulf War

Cited by 6 publications

References 0 publications

The myths and costs of autonomous weapon systems

The myths and costs of autonomous weapon systems

Practice-based and public-deliberative normativity: retaining human control over the use of force

Prospects for the global governance of autonomous weapons: comparing Chinese, Russian, and US practices

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