Human Rights and Democracy with Chinese Characteristics?

Abstract

Criticism has long been laid about China's unwillingness to subscribe to international human rights norms, the rule of law and liberal democratic practices. The United Nations and Western States and scholars have argued that human rights and liberal democracy underlain by a Western rule-of-law model are prerequisites to human development and governmental legitimacy. Is authoritarianism in China incompatible with human rights and democracy? Is the rule of law rejected entirely by the state apparatuses in China? Is there really no human rights protection under China's Constitution and laws? Has China's approach to international human rights law evolved since its realisation of the roles it may play in shaping international law? What do the Chinese people think or want about China's political reform vis-a'-vis human rights and democratic practices? With China's rise in the current international order, these questions raise important issues this article addresses.

Human Rights During Power Transitions

“…Of course, China has also advanced its own understanding of international human rights, emphasizing that monitors should understand and apply human rights with country "characteristics" (on "Chinese characteristics" see, for example, Chan, 2013;Ahl, 2015), the characteristics of developing countries, and so on. Moreover, China generally does not support UN investigation into the internal situation of states.…”

Regulatory arbitrage in relation to international human rights

“…Therefore, regulatory arbitrage in relation to human rights law is plausible because of negligible reputational costs due to inherent limitations of international human rights, such as debatable universal legitimacy (von Bernstorff 2008;Mayerfeld 2009;Chan 2013;Tasioulas 2013), differing interpretations of the provisions (Chinkin 2014; M egret 2014), and selective or substantial delay in international intervention (Habibi 2007;Walling 2015), as acknowledged in many prior studies. 4 If the reputational cost of human rights violation is economically negligible (Lebovic and Voeten 2009;Wintour 2015), this would encourage arbitrage practices.…”

“…The controversial nature of international human rights casts doubt on the legitimacy, ability, and capacity to deter violation of human rights (von Bernstorff 2008;Mayerfeld 2009;Chan 2013;Tasioulas 2013). If a state is driven by a rational arbitrage strategy, then low compliance can be expected when laws have limitations that can be capitalized on to disguise crimes against humanity.…”

“…If protecting human rights is viewed as costly and limiting the economic progress of the states (and state actors), then the controversial nature of international human rights law, such as debatable universal legitimacy (von Bernstorff 2008;Mayerfeld 2009;Chan 2013;Tasioulas 2013), differing interpretations of provisions (Chinkin 2014;M egret 2014), delayed intervention or selective international intervention (Habibi 2007;Walling 2015), and negligible reputational cost of violation (Lebovic and Voeten 2009;Wintour 2015), are likely to be exploited by states that violate human rights in pursuit of economic gains. Ineffective enforcement of international human rights policies and regulations means that the cost of regulatory arbitrage is negligible, which provides conditions that breed arbitrage actions among those economically driven states.…”

The Theoretical System of Human Rights with Chinese Characteristics

“…The base and basic political system on specific human rights (Chan, 2013). Only by safeguarding the people's freedom can we truly liberate the working people.…”