Hydro-hegemony and international water law: laying claims to water rights

Daoudy, Marwa

doi:10.2166/wp.2008.204

Cited by 43 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…Arguably, late developers may have had weaker bargaining power during negotiations than early developers; but it is precisely these inequitable relations that have been manifested in treaties that now form the basis of the UN Convention. Arguably, it is important to understand "the rules of the game" of international water sharing and how these rules are played out (Daoudy 2008); however, it seems very appropriate to question and maybe to reconsider "the games of the rule"-making.…”

Section: Has This Bias Towards Late Developers Been Overlooked In Thementioning

confidence: 99%

Late developers and the inequity of “equitable utilization” and the harm of “do no harm”

Wegerich¹,

Olsson

2010

Water International

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at their emphasis on the principle either of equitable utilization or of doing no harm and analysing the effect of these principles on late developers within a river basin. The analysis reveals that these rules increasingly favour first developers. Today, late developers have even less incentive to subscribe to these rules, but instead must either utilize their own dominance or have a powerful ally to develop their water resources. Given the Millennium Development Goals, the existing recommendations on the sharing of international rivers should be revised so as not to favour the early developers.

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Section: Has This Bias Towards Late Developers Been Overlooked In Thementioning

confidence: 99%

Late developers and the inequity of “equitable utilization” and the harm of “do no harm”

Wegerich¹,

Olsson

2010

Water International

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“…Each country also has a claim to river water. These claims can be based on any of a wide range of principles for river sharing (Wolf 1999;Daoudy 2008). Two common principles for river sharing are absolute territorial sovereignty (ATS) and absolute territorial integrity (ATI) (Salman 2007).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems

Ansink

Weikard

2011

Soc Choice Welf

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We analyse the redistribution of a resource amongst agents who have claims to the resource and who are ordered linearly. A well known example of this particular situation is the river sharing problem. We exploit the linear order of agents to transform the river sharing problem to a sequence of two-agent river sharing problems. These reduced problems are mathematically equivalent to bankruptcy problems and can therefore be solved using any bankruptcy rule. Our proposed class of solutions, that we call sequential sharing rules, solves the river sharing problem. Our approach extends the bankruptcy literature to settings with a sequential structure of both the agents and the resource to be shared. In the paper, we first characterise the class of sequential sharing rules. Subsequently, we apply sequential sharing rules based on four classical bankruptcy rules, assess their properties, provide two characterisations of one specific rule, and compare sequential sharing rules with three alternative solutions to the river sharing problem.

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“…The participation of these two countries to the negotiating table is likely to have occurred with the final goal of keeping Egyptian traditional influence and compliance-producing mechanisms 11 over the other states involved, in order to procrastinate the adoption of a comprehensive agreement where the reallocation of Nile quotas could erode the ''acquired rights'' of the downstream countries. As argued by Daoudy (2008), this strategy of ''active stalling'' is a conventional tool commonly used by hydrohegemons in order to oppose possible challenges to the status quo (Daoudy 2008(Daoudy , 2009). …”

Section: Evolving Power Relationships In the Blue Nile Basinmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic political contexts and power asymmetries: the cases of the Blue Nile and the Yarmouk Rivers

Hussein

Grandi

2017

Int Environ Agreements

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This paper explores the evolving patterns of hydropolitical relations in the dynamic contexts of Yarmouk and Blue Nile Rivers in comparison. The analysis aims at shedding light over the complex implications that recent political and social changes have aroused for the water disputes between Jordan and Syria on the one hand, and Ethiopia and Egypt on the other. In both basins, cooperative efforts toward the integrated management of transboundary waters have been only partially effective and largely undermined by the perpetuation of unilateral actions by riparian states. In the case studies, the lack of a basinwide vision over the control and use of shared waters has resulted in disputes among the basin states and ultimately in an unsustainable, unfair, and unwise utilization of the resources. This paper argues that a substantive and effective integration of national water policies is unlikely to occur, unless power asymmetries are properly addressed in order to overcome the likelihood of hegemonic regimes.

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Hydro-hegemony and international water law: laying claims to water rights

Cited by 43 publications

References 10 publications

Late developers and the inequity of “equitable utilization” and the harm of “do no harm”

Late developers and the inequity of “equitable utilization” and the harm of “do no harm”

Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems

Dynamic political contexts and power asymmetries: the cases of the Blue Nile and the Yarmouk Rivers

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