Hypnotic Disgust Makes Moral Judgments More Severe

Abstract

Highly hypnotizable participants were given a posthypnotic suggestion to feel a flash of disgust whenever they read an arbitrary word. They were then asked to rate moral transgressions described in vignettes that either did or did not include the disgust-inducing word. Two studies show that moral judgments can be made more severe by the presence of a flash of disgust. These findings suggest that moral judgments may be grounded in affectively laden moral intuitions.

Impaired Decoding of Fear and Disgust Predicts Utilitarian Moral Judgment in Alcohol-Dependent Individuals

“…As such, the current results are also consistent with the proposed role of emotion in deontological judgments (Schnall et al, 2008;Van Dillen et al, 2012;Wheatley and Haidt, 2005). More specifically, the successful induction of avoidance-related emotions (e.g., disgust or fear) may lead to deontological moral judgments (Harle and Sanfey, 2010;Ugazio et al, 2012).…”

“…Although future work is required to explore these effects, we suggest that the perception of fear in specific individuals may lead to an aversion to harming those individuals even when doing so may lead to saving other people, as in high-conflict scenarios (Crockett et al, 2010). On the other hand, low-conflict scenarios (e.g., causing harm for selfish benefit) may trigger moral disgust (Ugazio et al, 2012;Wheatley and Haidt, 2005).…”

Conformorality. A Study on Group Conditioning of Normative Judgment

“…Earlier research in psychology has examined, on the one hand, the effects of authority on obedience and norm compliance (Milgram, 1963), in-group/out-group effects on moral behavior (Tajfel et al, 1971), and the consequences of emotional cues on people's normative judgments (Schnall et al, 2008;Wheatley and Haidt, 2005). On the other hand, research studies on humans and nonhuman primates have shown that both species tend to adjust their behavior and beliefs toward others in their social circles (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004;Whiten, Horner and de Waal, 2005).…”

Neural evidence for “intuitive prosecution”: The use of mental state information for negative moral verdicts

“…Gazzaniga, 2005;Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001;Haidt, 2001;Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe, & Bloom, 2009;Mikhail, 2007;Moll, et al, 2005;Wheatley & Haidt, 2005). The majority of these studies focus on participants' negative evaluations of moral violations, for instance, hitting people with trolleys, breaking promises, distributing resources unfairly, and eating dead pets (Borg, Hynes, Van Horn, Grafton, & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2006;Cushman, 2008;Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004;Hauser, Cushman, Young, Jin, & Mikhail, 2007;Hsu, Anen, & Quartz, 2008).…”