I-ABM: combining institutional frameworks and agent-based modelling for the design of enforcement policies

Abstract

Computer science advocates institutional frameworks as an effective tool for modelling policies and reasoning about their interplay. In practice, the rules or policies, of which the institutional framework consists, are often specified using a formal language, which allows for the full verification and validation of the framework (e.g. the consistency of policies) and the interplay between the policies and actors (e.g. violations). However, when modelling largescale realistic systems, with numerous decision-making entities, scalability and complexity issues arise making it possible only to verify certain portions of the problem without reducing the scale. In the social sciences, agent-based modelling is a popular tool for analysing how entities interact within a system and react to the system properties. Agent-based modelling allows the specification of complex decision-making entities and experimentation with large numbers of different parameter sets for these entities in order to explore their effects on overall system performance. In this paper we describe how to achieve the best of both worlds, namely verification of a formal specification combined with the testing of large-scale systems with numerous different actor configurations. Hence, we offer an approach that allows for reasoning about policies, policy making and their consequences on a more comprehensive level than has been possible to date. We present the Institutional Agent-Based Model (I-ABM) methodology to combine institutional frameworks with agent-based simulations). We furthermore present J-InstAL, a prototypical implementation of this methodology using the InstAL institutional framework whose specifications can be translated into a computational model under the answer set semantics, and an agent-based simulation based on the JASON tool. Using a simplified contract enforcement example, we demonstrate the functionalities of this prototype and show how it can help to assess an appropriate fine level in case of contract violations.

InstAL: An Institutional Action Language

“…4. Balke et al [5] demonstrates the use of a normative framework to explore the parameter space for an enforcement policy and so establish appropriate levels for fines and (cost) effective levels of policing. 5.…”

“…InstAL supports the specification of both regulative and constitutive norms and incorporates the well-known deontic notions of permission and obligation (but not fullscale prohibition) [37], along with the institutional notion of power [21].Given a normative specification and some initial conditions (fluents), an ASP solver allows the testing of properties of specifications over finite time frames as part of a design process, or the monitoring of agents' normative positions as part of a simulation [26,5] or a live system [35].…”

Social Coordination Frameworks for Social Technical Systems

“…Even though no agents or organisation may appear in the actual code, thinking of the domain in terms of agents, organisations and associated control structures, helps clarify design assumptions and choices [52]. Time line: The research of the Falcon project 17 comprises a pilot study and implementation of a simulation framework to validate the results. The project lasted one year.…”

Self-Organising Error Detection and Correction in Open Multi-agent Systems

“…Similarly, experimentation with a social system that consists of adaptive agents is affected by volatile component behaviour (cf. [12], [13]). This randomness in simulations may generate varied outcomes for each repeated study, regardless of any policy's actual effectiveness.…”