2011
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00786.x
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Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification*

Abstract: This version of the distinction between undercutting and rebutting defeaters is crude but will do for our purposes. For recent discussion of the distinction see M. Bergmann, Justification Without Awareness, Oxford University Press, 2006, and for classic discussion see J. Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge. (Towota, NJ: Rowman And Littlefield Publishers). 1st edition, 1986. 15[15] Huemer (op cit, Chapter 5.4) makes explicit that his notion of justification is meant to be internalist. See also Pryor (20… Show more

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Cited by 235 publications
(107 citation statements)
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“…One possibility is influence on perception by desires and emotions. For related philosophical discussion, see Siegel 2012, Stokes 2012;. And there is certainly suggestive research in perceptual psychology.…”
Section: Predictive Coding and Cognitive Penetrabilitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…One possibility is influence on perception by desires and emotions. For related philosophical discussion, see Siegel 2012, Stokes 2012;. And there is certainly suggestive research in perceptual psychology.…”
Section: Predictive Coding and Cognitive Penetrabilitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Philosopher Susanna Siegel offers an everyday case of "cognitively penetrated perceptual experiences" [19]: Jill believes Jack is angry with her, so when she looks at him, Jack's face actually presents itself to her as angry. Jill uses this as evidence to confirm her (false) belief that Jack is angry with her.…”
Section: Power Pain and Moral Psychologymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A major objection to PC is that seemings caused by wishful thinking can provide prima facie justification for their content (see, e.g., Markie 2005: 356-7;Siegel 2012). HP will also be subject to such examples, because as Hasan notices, seemings can "be influenced by background cognitive states" (131).…”
Section: Hasan's Principle: the Second Hornmentioning
confidence: 99%