Kant's Concepts of Justification

XIV-Kant on the Ethics of Belief

“…Their strength warrants a matching degree of objective certainty in the subject, from insufficient to sufficient: 'When we know, namely, that we are free of all subjective grounds and yet the holding-tobe-true is sufficient, then we are convinced, and in fact logically convinced, or convinced on objective grounds (the object is certain) ' (ll, p. 576 [9:72]). Since there is no space to develop Kant's account of the grounds of cognition here, see Chignell (2007a) for useful discussions of this issue. 11 Kant adds that if we fail to acknowledge the grounds of our beliefs, we are merely persuaded, 'a holding-to-be-true on insufficient grounds, of which one does not know whether they are merely subjective or also objective'.…”

Kant on the bounds of promise making: A Mendelssohnian account

“…He writes: “[According to Kant], I can choose to take an unproved theorem in mathematics on board as a working assumption. If I am being rational, my assent in such a case (and everything that it implies) will be a weakly held ‘opinion’ ( Meinung ), at least until the theorem is somehow confirmed” (Chignell, , p. 35). Though initially it seems plausible that, in cases where evidence is subjectively insufficient, the will is free to choose whether it will opine or not, this does not seem to be Kant's considered position.…”

Is Kant (W)right? – On Kant’s Regulative Ideas and Wright’s Entitlements

“…Furthermore, the section, On having an opinion, knowing, and believing can be interpreted in such a way as to maintain that Kant allows for a mixture of internalist and externalist views of justification (cf. Chignell 2007). But if Kant's conception of justification is pluralistic anyway, then within this conception there might also be room for a non-evidential and consequentialist form of justification.…”