I-Knowing How and Knowing That: A Distinction Reconsidered

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to raise some questions about the idea, which was first made prominent by Gilbert Ryle, and has remained associated with him ever since, that there are at least two types of knowledge (or to put it in a slightly different way, two types of states ascribed by knowledge ascriptions) identified, on the one hand, as the knowledge (or state) which is expressed in the 'knowing that' construction (sometimes called, for fairly obvious reasons, 'propositional' or 'factual' knowledge) and, on the other, as the knowledge (or state) which is ascribed in the 'knowing how' construction (sometimes called 'practical' knowledge). 1 This idea, which might be said to be Ryle's most lasting philosophical legacy, has, in some vague form, remained part of conventional wisdom in philosophy since he put it forward. 2 My purpose here is fairly accurately described as 'raising questions', since both the criticisms of the received view (as I interpret it), and the positive alternative suggestions to be advanced, are, to some extent, tentative and exploratory. The aim is to assemble a broad range of evidence for the conclusion that we need to replace the standard account, to query especially what Ryle suggested as evidence for it, and to explore what seems to me to be the indicated replacement for it.

In support of anti-intellectualism

“…Thus, according to most anti-intellectualists, practical knowers differ from theoretical knowers by virtue of having an ability that theoretical knowers lack. 4 Intellectualist positions on knowing how have been defended by a number of philosophers, most recently by Stanley (forthcoming), Bengson and Moffett (2007), Snowdon (2004) and Stanley and Williamson (2001). 5 All of these philosophers agree that knowing how is a special kind of knowing that.…”

“…Some intellectualists claim that the identification of know how with ability is plainly false, since there are, uncontroversially, cases in which one has know how while lacking the corresponding ability (see, e.g., Bengson et al 2009;Bengson and Moffett 2007;Snowdon 2004;Stanley and Williamson 2001). I know how to shoot pool, for example, even though my arm is in a cast and I am therefore unable to shoot pool.…”

Development (and Evolution) of the Universe

“…It is mediated by languages, while the World is mediated to us through (what in Nature we know as) our biology (Uexküll 1926). The World is experienced and phenomenal, but is not 'known' (Snowdon 2008). My favorite example of this is that, while we may ride a bicycle, we do not 'know' (cannot describe) how we do it.…”

Know-how and concept possession

“…general entail possession of the corresponding abilities (Brown 1970;Ginet 1975, 8;Craig 1990, 158;Hyman 1999;Stanley and Williamson 2001;Snowdon 2004). 1 For instance, a figure skater might know how to perform an extremely difficult jump, such as a quintuple salchow, though she cannot actually do the jump herself.…”

“…What, then, accounts for the difference between (1a), which does not entail possession of the corresponding ability, and (2a), which does? 1 We will understand know-how attributions to be instances of the schema d x knows how to w e , which should be distinguished from instances of the schemas d x knows how one wÀs e , d x knows how people w e , d x knows how y wÀs e , and so on (see Stanley and Williamson 2001, Snowdon 2004, Noë 2005. By 'know-how', then, we mean knowledge how to perform a given activity, rather than mere knowledge how one performs or people perform or a particular person performs that activity.…”