I’m So Angry I Could Help You: Moral Outrage as a Driver of Victim Compensation

Thulin, Erik; Bicchieri, Cristina

doi:10.1017/s0265052516000145

Cited by 23 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…By contrast, in conditions where the target's bad outcome is due to an injustice (e.g. a partners' refusal to reciprocate), and is thus undeserved, it is moral outrage that is a better predictor than empathic concern of directing help toward the cheated person (Thulin & Bicchieri, 2016). In other words, empathy appears here again as sensitive to individuals' suffering regardless of the deservingness of that suffering, i.e.…”

Section: At the Proximate Level Empathy Operates Independently Of Moral Representationsmentioning

confidence: 94%

Are there really so many moral emotions? Carving morality at its functional joints

Fitouchi¹,

André²,

Baumard³

2021

Preprint

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In recent decades, a large body of work has highlighted the importance of emotional processes in moral cognition. Since then, a heterogeneous bundle of emotions as varied as anger, guilt, shame, contempt, empathy, gratitude, and disgust have been proposed to play an essential role in moral psychology. However, the inclusion of these emotions in the moral domain often lacks a clear functional rationale, generating conflations between merely social and properly moral emotions. Here, we build on (i) evolutionary theories of morality as an adaptation for attracting others’ cooperative investments, and on (ii) specifications of the distinctive form and content of moral cognitive representations. On this basis, we argue that only indignation (“moral anger”) and guilt can be rigorously characterized as moral emotions, operating on distinctively moral representations. Indignation functions to reclaim benefits to which one is morally entitled, without exceeding the limits of justice. Guilt functions to motivate individuals to compensate their violations of moral contracts. By contrast, other proposed moral emotions (e.g. empathy, shame, disgust) appear only superficially associated with moral cognitive contents and adaptive challenges. Shame doesn’t track, by design, the respect of moral obligations, but rather social valuation, the two being not necessarily aligned. Empathy functions to motivate prosocial behavior between interdependent individuals, independently of, and sometimes even in contradiction with the prescriptions of moral intuitions. While disgust is often hypothesized to have acquired a moral role beyond its pathogen-avoidance function, we argue that both evolutionary rationales and psychological evidence for this claim remain inconclusive for now.

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Section: At the Proximate Level Empathy Operates Independently Of Moral Representationsmentioning

confidence: 94%

Are there really so many moral emotions? Carving morality at its functional joints

Fitouchi¹,

André²,

Baumard³

2021

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…Moral outrage is a reaction to the circumstances in which a person violates the ethical values and standards of a community (Rushton, ). Moral emotions are perceived prevalent and powerful (Mara, Jackson, Batson, & Gaertner, ), which influence individuals' moral judgments and intentional behaviors towards transgressors and victims (Cheng, Ottati, & Price, ; Thulin & Bicchieri, ). Therefore, we propose that the expression of moral outrage will mediate the relationships between perceived public condemnation and avoidance intentions.…”

Section: Literature Review and Hypothesis Buildingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Perceived public condemnation and avoidance intentions: The mediating role of moral outrage

Shah

Chu

Qaisar

et al. 2019

Journal of Public Affairs

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The effects of intrapersonal emotion on consumers' behavior have long been studied, but the effects of interpersonal emotions on public's intentions remain poorly understood. People often get angry when they observe injustice with others but not themselves. Drawing on emotions as social information theory, we investigated how perceived public condemnation (knowledge that other also condemn a particular norm violation by an organization) affects the moral outrage of public and their future intentions toward the organization. A quantitative study was empirically examined through a sample of 107 users of a leading riding service in Pakistan. Data were analyzed through statistical tools (IBM SPSS & AMOS 21). Finding shows that perceived public condemnation was positively correlated with moral outrage and avoidance intentions of individuals. However, moral outrage mediates the association between perceived public condemnation and avoidance intentions of the public. The implications highlight the importance of a community's social norms and values to gauge the organization's reputation in people's eyes.

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“…This perceived unfairness with respect to how others are treated is termed moral outrage and is linked to prosocial engagement [37]. Moral outrage motivates people to want to effect prosocial change to maintain their self-image as a good person and/or change the social group or society for the better [38][39][40]. It has been argued that such moral outrage may motivate some people to donate blood as they perceive an inequality/unfairness in a system wherein the entire population is able to receive blood from the donations of a small minority [1, 5].…”

Section: Moral Outragementioning

confidence: 99%

Blood donor behaviour, motivations and the need for a systematic cross‐cultural perspective: the example of moral outrage and health‐ and non‐health‐based philanthropy across seven countries

Ferguson

Dorner

Masser

et al. 2018

ISBT Science Series

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Background Blood donation is a prosocial altruistic act that is motived by the mechanisms that underlie altruism (e.g. warm-glow, reciprocity, fairness/trust). Because there is consistent evidence that altruism and its mechanisms show cross-cultural variability, in the present paper we make the case for a cross-cultural perspective in blood donor research. MethodsWe analyse a subset of variables from a larger study, with samples drawn from seven countries (England, Malta, the Netherlands, Australia, the USA, Hungary, Italy: average N per country = 282). This subset of variables focuses on health (organ donor registration) and non-health (volunteering, donating money) philanthropy, family traditions of helping and moral outrage as predictors of blood donor status.Results We show two cross-cultural universals: (1) organ donor registration in opt-in countries is positively associated with blood donor status and (2) nonhealth philanthropy is generally unrelated to blood donor status. We also show two country-specific effects: (1) a family tradition for helping is associated with blood donor status in Italy only and (2) moral outrage is a predictor only in the USA. ConclusionsWe contend that these findings provide proof of principle why a cross-cultural perspective on blood donor behaviour is needed.

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I’m So Angry I Could Help You: Moral Outrage as a Driver of Victim Compensation

Cited by 23 publications

References 33 publications

Are there really so many moral emotions? Carving morality at its functional joints

Are there really so many moral emotions? Carving morality at its functional joints

Perceived public condemnation and avoidance intentions: The mediating role of moral outrage

Blood donor behaviour, motivations and the need for a systematic cross‐cultural perspective: the example of moral outrage and health‐ and non‐health‐based philanthropy across seven countries

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