‘…i Take Political Responsibility!’: The Theoretical and Empirical Relation Between Ministerial Responsibility and Ministerial Resignations in Germany

Abstract

How is the doctrine of ministerial responsibility applied in the decisions of German ministers (not) to resign? This question arises from an empirical puzzle as well as from a theoretical contradiction. Despite the prominent principle of ministerial responsibility, empirically, the ‘personal consequences' of ministerial scandals in their area of responsibility, display a large variance. Some ministers resign because of rather trifling affairs, others stay in office in spite of serious scandals. Taking into consideration the delegation relationship between the executive and the parliament, in view of the principal‐agent theory, a minister's resignation due to major political or personal misconduct is to be expected. On the other hand, the actual constitutional configuration of ministerial responsibility casts theoretical doubts on the ministerial loss of office. The quantitative analysis of 133 resignation issues in the years 1949 to 2009 reveals that ministerial responsibility bears no relevance to the decision whether to resign or not. Indeed, when the cause of the resignation issue is directly connected to ministerial responsibility, the probability of a resignation even decreases.

Crisis Accountability: Ministerial Resignations in Sweden

“…As expected at the outset of this study, the two theoretical perspectives applied complement each other in several ways and the implications of this study are straightforward. It is widely acknowledged that blame management studies need to better include contextual factors (e.g., individual, institutional, cultural and situational) in the analysis to help explain why blame processes develop as they do (Boin ; Fischer ; Hansen et al. ).…”

“…Recent studies of ministerial careers in European countries, including Sweden, indicate that ministers resign when they are forced to and not because of formal constitutional accountability mechanisms (Bäck et al. ; Fischer ; Svedin ). Factors both inside and outside the cabinet, such as accountability pressures from external arenas and understanding the context of specific resignations need to be examined (Fischer ; Hansen et al.…”

“…; Fischer ; Svedin ). Factors both inside and outside the cabinet, such as accountability pressures from external arenas and understanding the context of specific resignations need to be examined (Fischer ; Hansen et al. ).…”

Avoiding Blame in Policy Crises in Different Institutional Settings

“…Hinterleitner's (2020) comparative case-study across three political regimes with different institutional arrangements for ministerial responsibility confirms this effect. However, many studies have found that the link between formal accountability rules, such as ministerial responsibility, and forced resignations is imperfect at best (Berlinski et al, 2012;Fischer, 2012;Thompson & Tillotsen, 1999;Woodhouse, 1994). Fischer (2012, p. 616) goes even further in a later analysis of 133 German resignation issues, concluding that "the stronger the link between a resignation issue and ministerial responsibility, the less likely is a resignation" (original emphasis).…”

Accountability of immigration administration: comparing crises in Norway, Denmark and Germany

“…In the end, it also led to consequences in terms of the resignation of the 'deputy', but importantly not of the Minister of Foreign Affairs himself. There is no direct formal relationship between political accountability to parliament and the consequence in terms of the resignation of the 'deputy', and Germany does not have a formal rule of parliamentary no-confidence votes as they do in the Nordic countries (Fischer, 2012). However, if the opposition (political, external) and especially the media (social) had not been able to use this window of opportunity to demand information and debate, legal accountability would not have affected government's policy at all.…”