<i>What Is Scientific Progress?</i>

Bird, Alexander

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00638.x

Cited by 169 publications

(132 citation statements)

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“…The epistemic conception must answer these questions in a way that respects our intuitions about theoretical progress. Bird (2007) recognises the need to respond to the Grounding Question. He doesn't consider it in its full generality, but only in connection with his evaluation of the competing 'semantic' conception of progress, according to which progress is a matter of increasing verisimilitude.…”

Section: The Epistemic Conception and The Grounding Questionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Bird (2007) wants to exploit the key virtue of the verisimilitude account of progress by showing how to move from increasing verisimilitude to the (possibility of) accumulation of knowledge. (76-78) The extant verisimilitude accounts face a significant challenge, however: how to justify the equation of progress with increasing verisimilitude?…”

Section: Progress With Radically False Theoriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Or, a question that is simple to state, at least. Bird (2007) thinks the question also has a simple answer: science progresses by cumulating knowledge.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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What is theoretical progress of science?

Saatsi

2016

Synthese

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The epistemic conception of scientific progress equates progress with accumulation of scientific knowledge. I argue that the epistemic conception fails to fully capture scientific progress: theoretical progress, in particular, can transcend scientific knowledge in important ways. Sometimes theoretical progress can be a matter of new theories 'latching better onto unobservable reality' in a way that need not be a matter of new knowledge. Recognising this further dimension of theoretical progress is particularly significant for understanding scientific realism, since realism is naturally construed as the claim that science makes theoretical progress. Some prominent realist positions (regarding fundamental physics, in particular) are best understood in terms of commitment to theoretical progress that cannot be equated with accumulation of scientific knowledge.

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Section: The Epistemic Conception and The Grounding Questionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Progress With Radically False Theoriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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What is theoretical progress of science?

Saatsi

2016

Synthese

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“…This is partly because it seems rather odd to deny that science is making progress, but it is difficult to articulate in what sense exactly science is making progress. Recently, Bird (2007) has argued for an account of progress that has a rich tradition. According to Bird (2007, p. 64…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

What is Scientific Progress? Lessons from Scientific Practice

Mizrahi

2013

J Gen Philos Sci

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In a recent debate about the nature of scientific progress, Alexander Bird and Darrell Rowbottom have argued for two competing accounts of progress. According to Bird, scientific progress consists in the accumulation of scientific knowledge. Rowbottom, on the other hand, thinks that truth alone is necessary for progress. Both use thought experiments and appeal to intuitions in support of their views, and it seems fair to say that the debate has reached an impasse. In an attempt to avoid this stalemate, I propose to abandon appeals to intuitions and turn to scientific practice instead. I propose to examine the institution of the Nobel Prize, where scientists award their peers for what they consider to be important contributions to science, in order to shed new light on the question of scientific progress. I discuss two case studies that illustrate the way in which scientists make judgments about progress. As far as scientists are concerned, progress is made when scientific discoveries contribute to the increase of scientific knowledge of the following sorts: empirical, theoretical, practical, and methodological. I then propose that we should articulate an account of scientific progress that does justice to the way in which scientists evaluate progress. I discuss one way of doing so, namely, by abandoning the distinction between 'knowing that' and 'knowing how' and granting that know-how counts as scientific knowledge.

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“…My aim in (Bird 2007b) is to rehabilitate the much derided view of scientific progress as the accumulation of knowledge:…”

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confidence: 99%