Identity Theories

Polger, Thomas W.

doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00227.x

Cited by 6 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 56 publications

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“…The reductive physicalist strictly claims that there are such things as pains, but they turn out to be the very same things as neurophysiological states; to be in a pain just is to be in certain type of neurophysiological state. The status of reductive physicalism is very controversial even among naturalists (Polger 2009), and even more contentious is the sense in which the reductive physicalist can say there really are qualia (Dennett 1990). It is, to say the least, difficult to understand in what sense it can be said that neurophysiological states are the very same thing as certain qualitative states.…”

Section: Epiphenomenalism and The Problem Of Painmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Evolution of Suffering, Epiphenomenalism, and the Phenomena of Life: Evidential Problems for Naturalists

Madden¹

2021

Religions

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Paul Draper argues that the central issue in the debate over the problem of suffering is not whether the theist can offer a probable explanation of suffering, but whether theism or naturalism can give a better explanation for the facts regarding the distribution of pain as we find them. He likewise maintains a comparison of relative probabilities considering the facts of suffering; atheological naturalism is to be preferred. This essay proceeds in two phases: (a) It will be argued that mainstream positions in naturalistic philosophy of mind make it difficult to take pain as anything but epiphenomenal and therefore not subject to evolutionary explanation. While the distribution of suffering is a difficulty for the theist, the naturalist has equal difficulty explaining the fact that there is any suffering at all in the first place. Thus, the facts of suffering offer no advantage to the atheist. (b) Phenomenologists suggest that there is an intrinsic connection between animal life, pain, and normativity (including a summum bonum). The mere occurrence of life and normativity are, at least prima facie, more likely on the assumption of theism than atheism, so the theist may have a probabilistic advantage relative to the atheist. Phases (a) and (b) together support the overall conclusion that the facts of pain as we find them in the world (including that there is any pain at all) are at least as great, if not greater, a challenge for the atheist as they are the theist.

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Section: Epiphenomenalism and The Problem Of Painmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Evolution of Suffering, Epiphenomenalism, and the Phenomena of Life: Evidential Problems for Naturalists

Madden¹

2021

Religions

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“…Various forms of this stronger identity theory have been offered over the years ( Place, 1956 , 1988 ; Feigl, 1958 ; Smart, 1959 ; Lewis, 1966 ; Armstrong, 1968 ; Bechtel and Mundale, 1999 ; Polger, 2011 ; Polger and Shapiro, 2016 ; see also Gozzano and Hill, 2012 ). Debates within the philosophy of mind are quite extensive as regards the facets of the identity theory, its pros and cons (see Polger, 2009 , for an overview), but very little attention has been given to the pivotal question of what the neurophysiological and phenomenal kinds are. Most theorists participating in these debates use the notions of phenomenal and neurophysiological types only intuitively, without giving any explicit principles of individuation.…”

Section: The Science Of Consciousness Needs a Notion Of Typementioning

confidence: 99%

Neural Correlates of Consciousness Meet the Theory of Identity

Polak

Marvan

2018

Front. Psychol.

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One of the greatest challenges of consciousness research is to understand the relationship between consciousness and its implementing substrate. Current research into the neural correlates of consciousness regards the biological brain as being this substrate, but largely fails to clarify the nature of the brain-consciousness connection. A popular approach within this research is to construe brain-consciousness correlations in causal terms: the neural correlates of consciousness are the causes of states of consciousness. After introducing the notion of the neural correlate of consciousness, we argue (see Against Causal Accounts of NCCs) that this causal strategy is misguided. It implicitly involves an undesirable dualism of matter and mind and should thus be avoided. A non-causal account of the brain-mind correlations is to be preferred. We favor the theory of the identity of mind and brain, according to which states of phenomenal consciousness are identical with their neural correlates. Research into the neural correlates of consciousness and the theory of identity (in the philosophy of mind) are two major research paradigms that hitherto have had very little mutual contact. We aim to demonstrate that they can enrich each other. This is the task of the third part of the paper in which we show that the identity theory must work with a suitably defined concept of type. Surprisingly, neither philosophers nor neuroscientists have taken much care in defining this central concept; more often than not, the term is used only implicitly and vaguely. We attempt to open a debate on this subject and remedy this unhappy state of affairs, proposing a tentative hierarchical classification of phenomenal and neurophysiological types, spanning multiple levels of varying degrees of generality. The fourth part of the paper compares the theory of identity with other prominent conceptions of the mind-body connection. We conclude by stressing that scientists working on consciousness should engage more with metaphysical issues concerning the relation of brain processes and states of consciousness. Without this, the ultimate goals of consciousness research can hardly be fulfilled.

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“…The nature of identity has its origins in the philosophy of the Mind-Brain paradigm, in which the sensation of brain processes, or mental states, allow individuals to gain a sense of self (Polger, 2009). William James (1892), a philosopher and psychologist, referred to identity as a subjective self, or "self-as-I[me]" (McAdams, 2001, p. 104), in recognition that the actions of human beings are intentional and reflexive, acting on desires and beliefs to accomplish goals.…”

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confidence: 99%

The reciprocal relationship of self and practitioner: a narrative inquiry self-study

Stasi¹

2022

Preprint

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<p>In an increasingly demanding environment like healthcare, nurses may often be meeting their professional responsibilities at the expense of their personal needs. Existing research shows the benefits of engaging in experiential learning, such as reflective practices. By using reflective practices, nurses can reveal challenges in the workplace that affect their professional performance, opening discussion for how these could be mitigated. By engaging in a self-study, using Connelly and Clandinin’s Narrative Inquiry, I explore the mutually informing nature of personal and professional formation. I tell personal stories of my childhood and professional stories of my time as a nursing student, new graduate and current practitioner. Using the analytical framework of Narrative Inquiry, I identify two narrative patterns (vulnerability and belonging) in my lived and told stories. I highlight how social interactions influence our personal and professional identities, and how this understanding offers development opportunities to benefit the nurse-client relationship and society.</p>

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Identity Theories

Cited by 6 publications

References 56 publications

The Evolution of Suffering, Epiphenomenalism, and the Phenomena of Life: Evidential Problems for Naturalists

The Evolution of Suffering, Epiphenomenalism, and the Phenomena of Life: Evidential Problems for Naturalists

Neural Correlates of Consciousness Meet the Theory of Identity

The reciprocal relationship of self and practitioner: a narrative inquiry self-study

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