Ideology and strategic party disloyalty in the US house of representatives

Kirkland, Justin H.; Slapin, Jonathan B.

doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2017.07.006

Cited by 13 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 56 publications

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“… 155. Kirkland and Slapin (2017), Slapin et al (2018). On alliances between opposition parties in non-democracies and during transitions to democracy, see Buehler (2018). …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

On-Side fighting in civil war: The logic of mortal alignment in Syria

Schulhofer-Wohl

2020

Rationality and Society

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On-side fighting – outright violence between armed groups aligned on the same side of a civil war’s master cleavage – represents a devastating breakdown in cooperation. Its humanitarian consequences are also grave. But it has been under-recognized empirically and therefore under-theorized by scholars to date. This article remedies the omission. Existing research can be extrapolated to produce candidate explanations, but these overlook spatial and temporal variation in on-side fighting within a war. I provide a theory that accounts for this ebb and flow. On-side fighting hinges on belligerents’ trade-offs between short-term survival and long-term political objectives. Enemy threats to survival underpin on-side cooperation; in their absence, belligerents can pursue political gains against on-side competitors. I evaluate this threat-absence theory using evidence from the ongoing Syrian Civil War’s first years. Fine-grained fatalities data capture fluctuating enemy threats to on-side groups’ survival and situate on-side fighting and its absence. Findings support threat-absence theory and contribute to research on warfighting and political competition in civil wars and to the study of coalition dynamics in other settings, including elections and legislatures.

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“… 155. Kirkland and Slapin (2017), Slapin et al (2018). On alliances between opposition parties in non-democracies and during transitions to democracy, see Buehler (2018). …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

On-Side fighting in civil war: The logic of mortal alignment in Syria

Schulhofer-Wohl

2020

Rationality and Society

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“…Alternatively, ideology might predict these behaviors. Previous research shows ideological moderates and extremists vote less often with their party (Kirkland and Slapin 2017; Minozzi and Volden 2013). As such, we use first‐dimension DW‐NOMINATE scores to calculate a member’s Absolute Ideological Distance from the Party Median and expect this variable to be negative.…”

Section: Partisan Intensity and Legislative Behaviormentioning

confidence: 97%

Measuring Congressional Partisanship and Its Consequences

Gelman

Wilson

2021

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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We develop a method for measuring a legislator’s partisanship using their Twitter rhetoric. To do so, we classify over 2.1 million tweets sent during two congressional terms (2015 through 2018) to determine how often members use explicitly partisan language. Since lawmakers are strategic in how they communicate with the public, we argue our approach captures a member’s partisan intensity, the time and effort they devote to supporting their party. After validating our measure, we examine how partisanship affects commonly studied legislative behaviors. We show it predicts, independent of ideology, a lawmaker’s party‐unity voting and expressed bipartisanship. Additionally, we find that presidential support is principally driven by partisanship, not ideology. Our findings offer two contributions. First, we show that a member’s partisanship, based on how they talk about Democrats and Republicans online, is associated with their legislative behavior. Second, we measure a concept that is difficult to operationalize.

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“…Since these groups have the strongest convictions, they have a willingness to engage in lengthy fights to obtain their preferred outcomes (Egan ; Noel ). They may even strategically oppose their party on core issues to satisfy the most ideologically driven constituents (Kirkland and Slapin ).…”

Section: Leadership Responses To Factionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Partisan Infighting Among House Republicans: Leaders, Factions, and Networks of Interests

Bendix

MacKay

2017

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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Congressional parties are commonly viewed as unified legislative teams, but recent intraparty battles have revealed serious ideological divisions within the House Republican caucus. Using annual ratings from nearly 300 interest groups, we estimate the ideological locations of Republican legislators in order to map their party's factional structure. Based on the distribution of interest‐group support from 2001 to 2012, we detect three Republican factions that we characterize as worker oriented, pro‐business, and ethno‐radical. We find that Republican leaders block bills by legislators in the worker and ethno‐radical subgroups and that they advance bills by members in the corporate faction.

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Ideology and strategic party disloyalty in the US house of representatives

Cited by 13 publications

References 56 publications

On-Side fighting in civil war: The logic of mortal alignment in Syria

On-Side fighting in civil war: The logic of mortal alignment in Syria

Measuring Congressional Partisanship and Its Consequences

Partisan Infighting Among House Republicans: Leaders, Factions, and Networks of Interests

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