On-Side fighting in civil war: The logic of mortal alignment in Syria

Abstract

On-side fighting – outright violence between armed groups aligned on the same side of a civil war’s master cleavage – represents a devastating breakdown in cooperation. Its humanitarian consequences are also grave. But it has been under-recognized empirically and therefore under-theorized by scholars to date. This article remedies the omission. Existing research can be extrapolated to produce candidate explanations, but these overlook spatial and temporal variation in on-side fighting within a war. I provide a theory that accounts for this ebb and flow. On-side fighting hinges on belligerents’ trade-offs between short-term survival and long-term political objectives. Enemy threats to survival underpin on-side cooperation; in their absence, belligerents can pursue political gains against on-side competitors. I evaluate this threat-absence theory using evidence from the ongoing Syrian Civil War’s first years. Fine-grained fatalities data capture fluctuating enemy threats to on-side groups’ survival and situate on-side fighting and its absence. Findings support threat-absence theory and contribute to research on warfighting and political competition in civil wars and to the study of coalition dynamics in other settings, including elections and legislatures.

Game-theoretic agent-based modelling of micro-level conflict: Evidence from the ISIS-Kurdish war

“…When this conflict is active, rebel groups negotiate as the need for potential allies is higher, whereas in the absence of conflict with the main rival, fighting between rebel groups escalates. These findings are in line with work by Pischedda [ 24 ] and Schulhofer-Wohl [ 25 ]; the latter looks at on-side fighting in the early years of the Syrian Civil War. Schulhofer-Wohl observes regional variations in on-side violence, with significant instances in regions like Hasaka post-regime withdrawal, contrasting with Damascus where such violence is absent due to ongoing pressure from the regime.…”

“…This pattern supports Schwab’s thesis, highlighting the role of a common enemy in shaping rebel interactions. It is worth noting that Schulhofer-Wohl [ 25 ] finds no instances of on-side fighting between the rebel groups we are discussing here, strengthening the case for modelling the Kurdish-ISIS conflict in Rojava. Van Wilgenburg and Fumerton’s [ 26 ] analysis of the PYD-YPG’s consolidation of power in northeast Syria further illustrates the stability of alliances formed against a common rival, leading to the formation of the SDF, dominated by the Kurdish YPG.…”

The Public Relations of Armed Groups: Competition and Emulation in Multifaceted Conflicts

“…When victory against the common enemy nears, coalition members begin jockeying for the best possible position in the upcoming post-conflict order. Scholars of rebel movements note that as conflicts deescalate rebel groups increasingly engage in infighting, spoiling, defection, and other behaviors which perpetuate intragroup conflict (Christia 2012;Staniland 2014;Krause 2017;Schulhofer-Wohl 2020). In a movement which seeks to replace the government, the main prize from fighting is the ability to govern and enact one's preferred policies.…”

“…However, when the fighting stops, the government may seek to integrate or demobilize the group, resulting in a loss of access to these benefits. The threat of disbandment at the conclusion of conflict explains why rebel groups frequently turn on each other (Krause 2017;Schulhofer-Wohl 2020). "Wars of movement" against a common enemy give way to "wars of position" as former allies jockey to be on top when the fighting ends, perpetuating violent conflict.…”

“…Finally, this article sheds further light on the multifaceted dynamics of modern conflicts and the behavior of groups which compete in them. Research shows that members of rebel movements often compete with one another (Krause 2017;Schulhofer-Wohl 2020) or switch sides entirely (Christia 2012) in pursuit of primacy when fighting stops. A largely separate literature deals with the strategic alliances governments make with militias both at home (Ahram 2011;Carey et al 2016;Böhmelt and Clayton 2018) and abroad (Padró i Miquel and Yared 2012; Biddle et al 2018;Berman and Lake 2019).…”