If Only There Were a Blueprint! Factors for Success and Failure of UN Peace-Building Operations

Abstract

In spite of the fact that UN peacekeeping operations are a relative new field for scholarly research, the literature on the subject has grown into a substantial body. This article distils from this body of scholarly literature eleven clusters of factors for success and failure for UN peacekeeping operations in general and tests these on four case studies – Cambodia, Mozambique, Rwanda and El Salvador – of one particular type of UN peacekeeping operation: the UN peace-building operations. It concludes that although the results of the four cases of UN peace-building operations largely confirm the factors for success and failure as found in literature for UN peacekeeping operations in general, theory on UN peace-building operations still needs adjustment and fine tuning. Amongst others, it appears from the cases that two factors that receive a lot of attention in literature – the non-use of force by the operation and the need for a clear and detailed mandate – are less important.

International Peacebuilding and Local Success: Assumptions and Effectiveness

“…Of the inquiries that do look at peacebuilding success (usually just a part of larger studies), the majority focus on macro-level dynamics, such as national and international peace processes (e.g., Call and Wyeth 2008;Walter 2002), economic conditions (e.g., Paris 2004), and the specific characteristics of the international interveners, like their mandate (e.g., Doyle and Sambanis 2006;Van der Lijn 2009), vested interests (e.g., Adebajo 2011;Stedman 1997;Zartman 1989), and resources (e.g., Hampson 1996). These authors, along with most policymakers, assume that peace achieved on the national and international stages will automatically trickle down to the local spheres.…”

Scenarios for Sudan in 2012: crash or happy take‐off?

“…In order to ensure that all policy options were considered in a structured and systematic manner, they were chosen from a standardized toolbox of “policy tools” that can be used in crisis management and peace‐building. (Van der Lijn, 2006) The four scenarios are followed by conclusions and recommendations on how to better prepare for the future of Sudan in 2012 (the “policy tools”) and how to avert the worst outcomes. The description of the period 2009‐2012 describes partly a future history, which is now (in 2010) the past.…”

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in Libya and Syria

“…In parallel to Smith's study, Van der Lijn (2009) reviewed lessons learned literature that focused on UN peacekeeping operations -in contrast to the present study's interventionist approach. Using the cases of El Salvador 1991, Cambodia 1991, Rwanda 1993and Mozambique 1992/1994 Lijn identifies the following as conditions for success: Consent, willingness and sincerity; impartiality and the non-use of force; co-operation from important outside actors; sense of security of the parties; clear, appropriate and achievable mandate; timely deployment and at the right time; competent leadership/personnel and clear command structures; sufficiently long duration; internal and external co-ordination; ownership; and causes of the conflict.…”

“…Accordingly, this study is now in a position to be selective about some of the salient conditions for success. Based on a number of works (such as Regan, 1996;ICISS, 2001;Seybolt, 2008;Smith, 2006Smith, , 2008Van der Lijn, 2009;Goldstein, 2011;, the following slightly modified seven conditions appear relevant to answering the research questions. These includes [1] consent from the State or disputants, [2] structural understanding of the conflict, [3] number of lives saved, [4] intervener's willingness to take sides in a conflict, [5] use of robust force, [6] co-operation from important external or regional actors and [7] reasonable prospects.…”