If the Armada Had Landed: A Reappraisal of England's Defences in 1588

Abstract

The defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588 stands as one of the greatest triumphs of Elizabeth I's reign, but, the success of the navy notwithstanding, received wisdom presents the land defences as woefully inadequate. This article shows that the existing picture of the English preparations is flawed in several ways and that they were better organized, more efficient and more willing than has been recognized. The privy council was called upon to deploy limited forces to defend a long coastline against an unpredictable attacker, and the evidence shows that they contrived to maximize the effectiveness of the available resources whilst balancing the calls of military practicality, financial necessity and political constraints. An assessment is also made of the response from the counties, using the mobilization as a test case of the structures put in place by the Elizabethan regime to deal with such an emergency. I n an article of 1976, Geoffrey Parker offered a bleak assessment of England's preparedness to face a Spanish invasion in 1588. In the face of the finest army in Europe, Elizabeth I's preparations were hopelessly inadequate. Preparations were 'desperately behind-hand all over'. The strategy was poor, the command structure weak, the English officers divided amongst themselves on the strategy to be pursued. 'The troops at Dover (most of them raw recruits) began to desert in considerable numbers when the Armada came in sight off Calais. In any case, there were only 4,000 men in all, a ludicrously inadequate force.' The Duke of Parma's invading army would have been facing 'untrained troops without clear orders, backed up by only a handful of inadequately fortified towns'. On top of all this, the defensive forces were concentrated in Essex, and not the real intended target, Kent. Parker's account, developed over several works, has perhaps been the most influential treatment of I would like to record my gratitude to Richard Cust, Simon Adams and this journal's anonymous reader for their comments on this article. I must also acknowledge the support I have received from the AHRC, formerly the AHRB.

Reappraising the Elizabethan and Early Stuart Soldier: Recent Historiography on Early Modern English Military Culture

“…80 In 'If the Armada had Landed: A Reappraisal of England's Defences in 1588' (2008), Younger disputes Geoffrey Parker's claim that the militia was ill-prepared to meet the 1588 invasion and would surely have been defeated by the Spanish had Parma's army come ashore. 81 Using Privy Council orders, State Papers and lieutenancy books, Younger concludes that there was no 'army' of English trained bands assembled in the south to shadow the Armada as it made its way up the Channel. Instead, the Privy Council used 'careful and flexible planning' to call upon bands from various southern counties to assemble when required and, if need be, make their way to London if and when the capital was threatened.…”

Review of periodical literature published in 2008

“…A couple of articles explore military administration in radically different contexts. Younger rehabilitates English preparations for invasion in 1588. Militia mobilization showed the considerable organizational prowess of the new military structures, although they remained poorly trained and equipped.…”

The Speed and Efficiency of the Tudor South‐West's Royal Post‐Stage Service

“…In doing so, the article complements recent research by Neil Younger on war and politics in the Elizabethan counties. Younger has used a large quantity of previously ignored evidence to revise many existing assumptions about the ineptitude of the ‘political nation’ in fighting Elizabeth's wars. By assessing both the central regime and the county lieutenancies (which were responsible for preparing England's land defences in the localities and raising troops from the county militias for military action overseas), he has provided a much more positive assessment of the effectiveness of the Elizabethan state.…”