The defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588 stands as one of the greatest triumphs of Elizabeth I's reign, but, the success of the navy notwithstanding, received wisdom presents the land defences as woefully inadequate. This article shows that the existing picture of the English preparations is flawed in several ways and that they were better organized, more efficient and more willing than has been recognized. The privy council was called upon to deploy limited forces to defend a long coastline against an unpredictable attacker, and the evidence shows that they contrived to maximize the effectiveness of the available resources whilst balancing the calls of military practicality, financial necessity and political constraints. An assessment is also made of the response from the counties, using the mobilization as a test case of the structures put in place by the Elizabethan regime to deal with such an emergency. I n an article of 1976, Geoffrey Parker offered a bleak assessment of England's preparedness to face a Spanish invasion in 1588. In the face of the finest army in Europe, Elizabeth I's preparations were hopelessly inadequate. Preparations were 'desperately behind-hand all over'. The strategy was poor, the command structure weak, the English officers divided amongst themselves on the strategy to be pursued. 'The troops at Dover (most of them raw recruits) began to desert in considerable numbers when the Armada came in sight off Calais. In any case, there were only 4,000 men in all, a ludicrously inadequate force.' The Duke of Parma's invading army would have been facing 'untrained troops without clear orders, backed up by only a handful of inadequately fortified towns'. On top of all this, the defensive forces were concentrated in Essex, and not the real intended target, Kent. Parker's account, developed over several works, has perhaps been the most influential treatment of I would like to record my gratitude to Richard Cust, Simon Adams and this journal's anonymous reader for their comments on this article. I must also acknowledge the support I have received from the AHRC, formerly the AHRB.

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The revival of the lord lieutenancies in July 1585 was a landmark in the development of early modern county government. It has customarily been linked to England's decision to go to the aid of the Dutch rebels, in effect starting open warfare with Spain. Yet the months preceding this move, in late 1584 and early 1585, were dominated by one of the most intense political crises of the reign, when fears for Elizabeth I's safety gripped the political nation and drove ministers to consider radical ways to secure the future of Protestant England. This context highlights other potential functions of the lieutenancy, as a security measure for ministers who might be contemplating a 'republican' interregnum.

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In September 1579, at the height of an intense political debate over her prospective marriage to the duke of Anjou, Elizabeth I visited New Hall, the country seat of the match's greatest supporter within England, Thomas Radcliffe, third earl of Sussex. Her entertainment on that occasion, hitherto completely unknown, was described in a letter, printed here, from one Norfolk gentleman, Sir Edward Clere, to another, Bassingbourne Gawdy. The letter describes the dramatic performances and other entertainments provided for the queen, which included coded but unmistakeable encouragements for her to proceed with the marriage. This article discusses the ways in which this was done and their consequences for our knowledge of the Anjou marriage debate as a political episode, suggesting that Sussex sought to use the entertainment to boost the participation of more conservative members of the nobility in government. It also explores how this evidence affects our picture of Elizabethan courtly entertainments, and particularly their non-dramatic elements. Finally, it discusses Clere's letter itself as an insight into the nature of gentry news culture, particularly with regard to matters of high politics.