“If you compress the spring, it will snap back hard”: The Ukrainian crisis and the balance of threat theory

Abstract

The narrative of an aggressive and neo-imperialist Russia that has dominated analyses of the 2014 Ukrainian crisis lacks theoretical rigour. We argue that a sustainable transformation of the Ukrainian crisis requires an accurate analysis of the context of the conflict, which should include an understanding of Moscow’s perception of the threats to its interests. This policy brief develops a theoretical understanding of the Ukrainian crisis through the lens of Stephen M. Walt’s balance of threat theory. We conclude that a realist analysis will help to explain Russian actions.

Hooked on a Feeling: Russia's Annexation of Crimea Through the Lens of Emotion

“…American and European leaders had ignored the facts of “realpolitik” and stumbled into a crisis of their own making. In a similar way, Bock et al (2015) apply balance‐of‐threat theory to the case of Ukraine and find that Western policymakers failed to see how their actions could be seen as a threat to Russian interests; and Alexander Korolev (2018) views Russia's actions in Ukraine as part of a broader “hard balancing response” (p. 889) to U.S. hegemony.…”