Ignore risk; Maximize expected moral value

Zhao, Michael

doi:10.1111/nous.12398

Cited by 7 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 23 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…In contrast to this suggestion, numerous studies have shown that doctors’ own risk attitudes, rather than those of their patients, affect the clinical decisions they make 46–48. Meanwhile, in a parallel body of emerging literature about making risky decisions on behalf of others, which is not specific to medical contexts, philosophers adopt a range of positions about what risk attitude ought to be adopted 24 49–56…”

Section: Risk Attitudes and Deferencementioning

confidence: 99%

Patients, doctors and risk attitudes

Makins

2023

J Med Ethics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

A lively topic of debate in decision theory over recent years concerns our understanding of the different risk attitudes exhibited by decision makers. There is ample evidence that risk-averse and risk-seeking behaviours are widespread, and a growing consensus that such behaviour is rationally permissible. In the context of clinical medicine, this matter is complicated by the fact that healthcare professionals must often make choices for the benefit of their patients, but the norms of rational choice are conventionally grounded in a decision maker’s own desires, beliefs and actions. The presence of both doctor and patient raises the question of whose risk attitude matters for the choice at hand and what to do when these diverge. Must doctors make risky choices when treating risk-seeking patients? Ought they to be risk averse in general when choosing on behalf of others? In this paper, I will argue that healthcare professionals ought to adopt a deferential approach, whereby it is the risk attitude of the patient that matters in medical decision making. I will show how familiar arguments for widely held anti-paternalistic views about medicine can be straightforwardly extended to include not only patients’ evaluations of possible health states, but also their attitudes to risk. However, I will also show that this deferential view needs further refinement: patients’ higher-order attitudes towards their risk attitudes must be considered in order to avoid some counterexamples and to accommodate different views about what sort of attitudes risk attitudes actually are.

show abstract

Section: Risk Attitudes and Deferencementioning

confidence: 99%

Patients, doctors and risk attitudes

Makins

2023

J Med Ethics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…4 4 There are also explicit arguments in favour of a risk‐neutral version of EUT. In the moral context, see, for instance, Zhao (forthcoming). …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Taking Risks on Behalf of Another

Thoma

2023

Philosophy Compass

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

A growing number of decision theorists have, in recent years, defended the view that rationality is permissive under risk: Different rational agents may be more or less risk-averse or risk-inclined. This can result in them making different choices under risk even if they value outcomes in exactly the same way. One pressing question that arises once we grant such permissiveness is what attitude to risk we should implement when choosing on behalf of other people. Are we permitted to implement any of the rationally permissible risk attitudes, is there some specific risk attitude that is required when choosing for others, or are we required to defer to the risk attitudes of the people on whose behalf we are choosing? This article elaborates on this question, explains its wider practical and theoretical significance, provides an overview of existing answers, and explores how to go about providing a more systematic account of how to choose on behalf of others in risky contexts. Introduction: Permissiveness of Rationality under RiskA growing number of decision theorists have, in recent years, defended the view that rationality is permissive under risk in the following sense. Consider a decision problem under risk: There is an agent who faces a choice between a number of different options. She values the different potential outcomes of her choice to different extents, but she does not know for sure what outcome each of the options available to her will bring about. She can, however, assign probabilities to how likely different outcomes are to come about as a consequence of the available options. Those who believe that rationality is permissive under risk grant that rational agents are free to make such risky choices in more or less riskaverse or risk-inclined ways. If rationality is permissive under risk, then the probabilities assigned to the potential outcomes, along with knowing the extent to which the agent values the outcomes do not fix how she should rationally choose.The following example illustrates this idea. Suppose you have to choose between two different medical treatments to undergo for a life-threatening condition. These treatments do not affect the quality of your life, and you moreover judge each of your remaining years

show abstract

Applying Pascal’s Wager to Procreation

Blackshaw

2024

SOPHIA

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Pascal’s wager uses decision theory to argue that it is rational to attempt to nurture belief in God, based on the expected utility of believing (infinite happiness) compared to not believing (at best, only finite happiness). A belief in an eternal conscious torment in hell (infinite suffering) for non-believers makes the differences in expected utility even more apparent, strengthening the argument. Similar reasoning can also be used to calculate the expected moral value of actions, including procreation. Under theism, if possible future children might suffer eternal conscious torment, the expected moral value of procreation is extremely negative. This implies that theists have a moral obligation not to procreate, which for most theists, entails a moral obligation to be celibate or to undergo sterilisation surgery.

show abstract

Ignore risk; Maximize expected moral value

Cited by 7 publications

References 23 publications

Patients, doctors and risk attitudes

Patients, doctors and risk attitudes

Taking Risks on Behalf of Another

Applying Pascal’s Wager to Procreation

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About