Illusions, objectivity, and non-reductive emergentism: Reply to Rose

Abstract

In the target article, David Rose makes an interesting and substantive case against a certain kind of sceptical view: “veridical perception is impossible in principle,” combined with a certain version of anti-realism. He proceeds by first illustrating several ideas from George Orwell’s seminal work, and then proposes that a certain kind of non-reductive, levelled emergentist metaphysics can help us respond to such scepticism. In this commentary, I join forces with Rose’s case, but will point out that we need to take seriously two discussions in contemporary philosophy in order to make the realist case stronger: the argument from illusion and hallucination, and the causal exclusion argument. Only then do Rose and his allies can have a more satisfactory case for objectivity and realism.

Taking Conceptual Issues Really Seriously: One Next Step for the Cognitive Science of Consciousness

“…On cognitive theories of consciousness (Graziano, 2022), it is stated that noncognitive theories of consciousness are versions of mysticism, which hold that “experience is nonphysical” (p. 2), but actually, noncognitive theories, such as Ned Block's, are highly empirically oriented and naturalistic (2007, 2011, 2018). Also, see Cheng (2022) for a detailed engagement of another case (Rose, 2022).…”

More on realism, phenomenology, and causation, in reply to Cheng

“…Date Received: 8 August 2022; accepted: 2 September 2022 I thank Cheng (2022) for his reply to my paper on illusions (Rose, 2022: which I'll call the Target Article) and welcome his enthusiasm and erudition on the topic. My comments are firstly to correct some misapprehensions and second to present some substantial replies.…”