(Im-)Mobile policies: Why sustainability went wrong in the 2014 Olympics in Sochi

Abstract

This paper proposes a tripartite framework of transportation, transformation and translation to conceptualise the circulation, mutation and impacts of mobile policies as translocal, socio-material networks. Drawing on material from semi-structured interviews, participant observation and documents it considers the value of this framework by examining the mobility of the sustainability agenda of the Winter Olympic Games 2014 in Sochi, Russia. The paper shows how sustainability policies were packaged and mobilised to flow to Russia ( transportation), how ineffective governance arrangements, a lack of institutional controls and time pressure altered them ( transformation) and how the results fell far short of initial bid commitments ( translation). As such, it sheds light onto the multiple immobilities and mutations that come with the attempts to mobilise policies.

The role of organizational culture in policy mobilities – the case of South Korean climate change adaptation policies

“…Practices and organizational culture are linked in two ways: on the one hand, practices are influenced by organizational culture; on the other hand, practices constitute organizational culture, and through alteration of practices these cultures are changeable. In the policy mobility literature, the translation of mobile policies has been mainly examined with the help of qualitative methods (Peck and Theodore, 2012;Wood, 2016), such as interviews and document analysis (Freeman, 2012;Temenos and McCann, 2012;Müller, 2014). Although these methods are valuable for the investigation of organizational culture, only the ethnography of a political institution can fully deliver the set of constituting translation practices (Marcus, 1995), simply because practices are often habitual and can be overseen in interview situations.…”

Global games, local rules: Mega-events in the post-socialist world

“…The competition for mega-events is global, the marketing rhetoric is often inter-changeable and the consulting companies are the same. For the 2014 Winter Games in Sochi, for example, the organising committee adopted policies from the previous host in Vancouver (Müller, 2015) and Poland hired PriceWaterhouseCoopers, KPMG and Deloitte as consultants for Euro 2012 (Cope, 2015). In this sense, Eastern European mega-event hosts operate in the same global networks that tie together Vancouver and London, Rio and Tokyo.…”

“…Here, the national state maintained control over the organisation of mega-events and the distribution of funds, contracts and other resources (Müller, 2011(Müller, , 2015Trubina, 2015). With its centralised fiscal structure, hosting events has emerged as a state strategy for influencing urban development and as a strategy for cities to tap into infrastructural development funds from the central state.…”

“…We finally have the chance to show how far Ukraine has developed in the past years and that we are a part of Europe' (European Centre for a Modern Ukraine, 2012: 2). The Winter Olympics in Sochi, too, were meant to showcase claims to build a European-style resort to rival traditional centres like Zermatt and Chamonix, while incorporating the highest standards of sustainability (Müller, 2015), and the World Cup 2018 is meant to present Russian cities 'without a shade of provinciality ' (Makaraychev and Yatsyk, 2015). In cities that are already global, this need to prove themselves on the global stage does not exist to the same extent, but here mega-events boost the specific interests of urban renewal and gentrification, as occurred in Barcelona (McNeill, 2005), London (Watt, 2013), Vancouver (Vanwynsberghe et al, 2013), Rio de Janeiro (Gaffney, 2010) and elsewhere.…”

From sacred cow to cash cow: The shifting political ecologies of protected areas in Russia

“…The developer OAO Northern Caucasus Resorts is pursuing this project, which envisions building 1 100 km of ski runs and 140 000 hotel beds for an expected 10 m annual visitors and at a price tag of 450 bn roubles (about 10 bn €) (JoHnson 2012). The amendments constituted a compromise between developers and protectionists in face of the threat to downsize Sochi National Park to allow for construction of winter sports facilities (Müller 2014). While such downsizing would have given over the excluded territory to privatisation, and thus up for grabs for both developers and state officials, under the new legislation the areas remain under the jurisdiction and ownership of the protected areas.…”