Image Consciousness and the Horizonal Structure of Perception

Hopp, Walter

doi:10.1111/misp.12070

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 36 publications

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“…But it does not count as seeing more of the image object. Furthermore, not every change in the orientation of the physical image constitutes a change in the orientation of the image object (Hopp, 2017, p. 133).…”

Section: The Stratification Of Realitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Phenomenology and the stratification of reality

Kinkaid

2020

European J of Philosophy

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Phenomenologists have no taste for desert landscapes. The early phenomenologists—Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler, and Roman Ingarden—adopt stratified views of reality on which spiritual objects like artifacts and persons are distinct from their underlying matter. Call this view “pluralism.” After describing Scheler, Ingarden, and Husserl's pluralism about goods, literary artworks, and images, respectively, I reconstruct a phenomenological case for pluralism from Husserl's work and defend it against an objection. The phenomenological method reveals a special subset of objects' essential properties: modes of givenness. On Husserl's view, there are necessary correlations between types of objects and the types of intentional acts through which they are given. Spiritual objects, unlike their matter, can only be given in acts belonging to the “personalistic attitude,” which has a motivational and expressive structure. My broader claim is that Husserl's phenomenology is a sophisticated metametaphysical view about the methodology of first‐order metaphysical inquiry.

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Section: The Stratification Of Realitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Phenomenology and the stratification of reality

Kinkaid

2020

European J of Philosophy

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Sartre's Exclusion Claim: Perception and Imagination as Radically Distinct Consciousnesses

Mitchell

2024

European J of Philosophy

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In The Imaginary Jean‐Paul Sartre makes what will strike many as an implausibly strong claim, namely that perception and imagination are incompatible kinds of experience ‐ I call this the exclusion claim. This paper offers a reconstruction of Sartre's exclusion claim. First, it frames the claim in terms of cross‐modal attention distribution, such that it is not possible to simultaneously attend to what one is imagining and what one is perceiving. However, this leaves it open that a subject can simultaneously imagine and perceive on the condition that either the perceived or imagined objects are not attended to. While this is a philosophically plausible position it fails to do justice to Sartre's intended position, which suggests a more radical exclusion between perception and imagination. In light of this section 3 develops a supplementary argument to remove one of the possible configurations of attention that the ban on divided attention leaves in place by arguing that the objects of imagining must be attended to, which follows from Sartre's characterisation of imagination as spontaneous. The resulting exclusion is as follows: attentive perception excludes imagination (and vice versa), given that the latter is necessarily attentive, but attentive imagination can co‐occur with non‐attentive or background perception (in this sense the exclusion is asymmetric in a way that Sartre fails to recognise). In concluding I detail how from this exclusion we get an important consequence – which Sartre wants the exclusion claim to have – namely that it rules out an imagination‐based solution to the problem of perceptual presence.

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Image Consciousness and the Horizonal Structure of Perception

Cited by 2 publications

References 36 publications

Phenomenology and the stratification of reality

Phenomenology and the stratification of reality

Sartre's Exclusion Claim: Perception and Imagination as Radically Distinct Consciousnesses

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