Images, symbols, and skills.

Abstract

A good deal of confusion marks current accounts of mental imagery and, by extension, other issues related to the representation of knowledge. We have analyzed and tried to resolve some of the confusion. In the first part of the paper we evaluate the pictorial views of imagery of Paivio, Shepard, Kosslyn, Neisser; and the propositional views of Anderson, Norman and Rumelhart, and Pylyshyn, among others. We show that part of the dispute between these groups is based on a misconceived notion of the way pictures may function as symbols, and of the role of symbolization in cognitive processes and in theory construction. Then we develop an alternative to the dispute to show how a properly conceived notion of symbolization incorporates the virtues of both the pictorialists and the propositionalists. We also develop the notion that rather than in a representation-process sort of theory, cognitive processes be understood in terms of skills in the manipulation of symbols and in the relating of symbols to the semantic domains that they map.'We use the term representation in a neutral sense to refer to the interiorized aspect of a person's knowledge; it may be expressed pictorially, linguistically, motorically, or otherwise.'Exactly the same error of attribution made by Rosenberg and Simon is found in a new paper by Anderson and Paulson (1978). Attempting to show that face recognition could be accounted for in propositional terms, they assigned notational status to Identikit features. Despite this, the test outcome was not clear-cut.

Determining the shapes of landsurfaces from topographical maps

“…That is, he or she seeks to generate into working memory a cognitive model or simulation of the potential appearance of the viewed landsurface (see Kolers andSmythe 1979 andYates 1985). This visualization could then be compared directly, , rather than analytically, to the criterion landsurface.…”

On the perceptual specificity of memory representations

“…Importantly, within the proceduralist framework knowledge is conceptualised as the skilled manipulation of symbols. This conception leads to analysis of the nature of symbols, and of systems of symbols (Kolers & Smythe, 1979, 1984. A critical consequence is that knowledge is dependent on the means of acquisition.…”

“…MEMORY, 2002, 10 (5/6), 365-379 Thus, in attempting to evaluate the LOP framework it is important to examine alternative theoretical proposals and empirical evidence suggesting perceptual specificity of memory representations (i.e., long-term retention of surface characteristics). The present research was inspired by one such theoretical framework developed by Paul Kolers and his colleagues (e.g., Kolers, 1968Kolers, , 1973Kolers, , 1975Kolers, , 1976Kolers, , 1978Kolers, , 1979Kolers & Magee, 1978;Kolers, Palef, & Stelmach, 1980;Kolers & Perkins, 1975;Kolers & Roediger, 1984;Kolers & Smythe, 1979, 1984. Accordingly, in the first part of this paper Kolers' work is briefly reviewed.…”

Dynamic mental representations.

“…In most of this research mental representations have not been considered to be, in any fundamental sense, dynamic (Kolers & Smythe, 1979). This is especially true for theories about the mental representation of objects or categories of objects.…”