IMF Programmes in Developing Countries

Killick, Tony

doi:10.4324/9780203400357

Cited by 180 publications

(105 citation statements)

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“…By the mid-1960s all drawings exceeding 25% of a member's quota became subject to conditionality. In line with the organization's evolving monetary approach to balance of payments management, clauses concerning the tightening up of credit creation and money supply appeared increasingly regularly in lending agreements (Killick 1995;Haggard 1985).…”

Section: Executive Board Discussion Of Enhanced Conditionalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…And while much analysis of the impact of IMF concessional lending operations has been undertaken (e.g., Dreher 2009;Steinwand and Stone 2008;V r e e l a n d2006; Barro and Lee 2005;Joyce 2004;Vreeland 2003;Kolko1999;Bird1995;Killick 1995;Conway1994), less attention has been placed on the internal dynamics that led operations to take shape as they did. It is towards this issue that this article is ultimately directed, a task that I approach through the analysis of recorded minutes of Executive Board Meetings (EBMs) at which the establishment of, and reforms to, ESAF were discussed from 1987 to 1998.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Global governance behind closed doors: The IMF boardroom, the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, and the intersection of material power and norm stabilisation in global politics

Clegg

2011

Rev Int Organ

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Up on the 12th floor of its 19th Street Headquarters, the IMF Board sits in active session for an average of 7 hours per week. Although key matters of policy are decided on in the venue, the rules governing Boardroom interactions remain opaque, resting on an uneasy combination of consensual decision-making and weighted voting. Through a detailed analysis of IMF Board discussions surrounding the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), this article sheds light on the mechanics of power in this often overlooked venue of global economic governance. By exploring the key issues of default liability and loan conditionality, I demonstrate that whilst the Boardroom is a more active site of contestation than has hitherto been recognized, material power is a prime determinant of both Executive Directors' preferences and outcomes reached from discussions. And as the decisions reached form the backbone of the 'instruction sheet' used by Fund staff to guide their everyday operational decisions, these outcomes-and the processes through which they were reached-were factors of primary importance in stabilizing the operational norms at the heart of a controversial phase in the contemporary history of IMF concessional lending.

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Section: Executive Board Discussion Of Enhanced Conditionalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Global governance behind closed doors: The IMF boardroom, the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, and the intersection of material power and norm stabilisation in global politics

Clegg

2011

Rev Int Organ

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“…The existing empirical literature about IMF programmes has mainly focused, so far, on the macroeconomic impact of such programmes (see, for example, the brief survey in Killick, 1995). However, a recent stream of research has also tried to specify and estimate a model including the factors which lead developing countries to borrow from the IMF in the …rst place.…”

Section: Fund Arrangementsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This distinction between a "demand" and a "supply side" on IMF arrangements was made …rst in the paper by Knight and Santaella (1997) (Section 2.1). Unfortunately, we could not use here the other three variables in their paper as three more "instruments"; that is "nominal depreciation exceeding 5%", "two year change in government revenues" 12 See Maddala (1983), p.122.…”

Section: The Identi…cation Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Adoption of an IMF programme and debt rescheduling. An empirical analysis

Marchesi

2003

Journal of Development Economics

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The existence of an empirical relationship between the adoption of an IMF programme and the concession of a debt rescheduling by commercial and o¢cial creditors is tested using a bivariate probit model. If countries who have arrangements with the IMF are more likely than others to obtain a rescheduling of their external debt we could conclude that the adoption of an IMF programme could work as a sort of signal of a country's "good willingness", which is thus rewarded with the debt relief. The results con…rm the existence of a signi…cant e¤ect of the adoption of an IMF programme on the subsequent concession of a debt rescheduling by creditors.

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“…They reason with Fafchamps (1996) on the issue. Killick (1995) has argued that over reliance on conditionality has bred a habit of non-compliance.…”

Section: Summary Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Does Conditionality on Borrowing Help?

Eyi-Mensah¹

2016

IBR

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Borrowers of international financial institutions (IFIs) have both interest and conditionality to deal with. Using data from the World Governance Indicators (WGI), we investigated the influence of conditionality on borrowers. By applying a dynamic panel regression method, we found compelling evidence, which supports our intuition that conditionality increases the debt burden of borrowing countries. However, this was not the case for all the indebted countries. Heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) had some of their external commitments reduced when they agreed to implement some sets of conditionality. In light of these findings, we posit that the advocated structural reforms which is used, as a justification for prescribing conditionality does not materialize as planned. It however, erodes the capacity of borrower countries toward their debt servicing obligations. A direct consequence is their incessant need for external development assistance. Results of the study also proved robust.

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IMF Programmes in Developing Countries

Cited by 180 publications

References 0 publications

Global governance behind closed doors: The IMF boardroom, the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, and the intersection of material power and norm stabilisation in global politics

Global governance behind closed doors: The IMF boardroom, the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, and the intersection of material power and norm stabilisation in global politics

Adoption of an IMF programme and debt rescheduling. An empirical analysis

Does Conditionality on Borrowing Help?

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