IMF reform after the crisis

Abstract

The global financial crisis moved the International Monetary Fund (IMF) back to the center stage, after some years of disengagement by major emerging markets and developing countries (EMDCs). Neo-liberal institutionalism predicts that crises in a highly interdependent world induce states to strengthen multilateral institutions. In the case of the IMF, many observers believed that a more effective IMF was contingent on giving EMDCs a larger voice. However, the 2010 Quota and Governance Reform at the IMF fell below expectations in this regard. On the basis of an analysis of the ex ante preferences and power relations of the major players, we show that this should not come as a surprise and that the 2010 reform agreement has reached the boundaries of the politically possible. Hence, this empirical case study brings in power and preferences to qualify the more optimist neo-liberal institutionalist accounts against the backdrop of an increasingly multipolar world

The G20 and the BRICS on Trade and Investment: Trends and Policies

“…In 2010, after the entry of South Africa, the grouping was renamed for the third summit to BRICS. The BRICS has discussed a variety of topics, and most importantly founded the New Development Bank (NDB) as an alternative to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) [for more on this, see Lesage, Debaere, Dierckx et al, 2013;. So far, there have been eight annual summits.…”

Spatial Fragmentation of, and US Support for, the Main Multilateral Institutions of the Western Order

“…However, besides the rhetorical emphasis on the rebalancing of the IMF to increase representativeness of developing countries, many scholars (among others, Wade 2011; Woods 2010; Lesage et al 2013) have highlighted that the change has been minimal, and that those who controlled the IMF still do. The voting shares of the developed countries that were already controlling the decision-making process have been reduced from 57.9% to 55.3% (Wade 2011, p. 364).…”

“…According to Woods (2010, p. 56), the biggest winners of the reform were South Korea, Singapore, Turkey, China, India, Brazil and Mexico, so countries considered close to the US benefitted too, and "the results do little to offset the perception of emerging economies that the IMF is mostly a US organization". IMF (2015, p. 42) Reconstructing the US negotiating position, Lesage et al (2013) argue that, coming after the financial crisis, the US had a strong preference for boosting international liquidity, but was aware of the need to involve the emerging powers. This also fitted well with its intentions to renew the institution and preserve its mission.…”

Representation and Governance in International Organizations

“…Undercutting any notion of representation is the simple fact the current process does not provide mechanisms by which an elected ED can be held accountable to other members of his or her constituency. IMF governance reforms agreed to in 2008 and 2010 tinkered with the representation of members but did not result in major realignments (Lesage, Debaere, Dierckx, & Vermeiren, 2013;Wade & Vestergaard, 2015).…”