Immigration Amnesty and Immigrant's Earnings

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in ABSTRACTWe review the role immigration amnesties have played in US immigration policy, placing them in the context of similar programs embarked upon by other nations. The theory of amnesties suggests rent-seeking, bargaining, and costs as reasons for a country offering an amnesty, often in conjunction with increased border controls, internal enforcement and employer penalties. We model an immigration amnesty in which the destination country has a formal sector employing only legal immigrants, an informal sector employing both legal and illegal immigrants, and open unemployment. The model focuses on the productivity enhancing effects of legalization, and establishes specific conditions under which unemployment, the informal sector and the formal sectors increase/decrease in size. Building on these insights, our empirical work examines Mexican migration to the US. We study who are migrants; among migrants, who are legalized via IRCA, and who are legalized via sponsorship of family or employer. Furthermore, to measure the impact of amnesty on welfare of migrants, we estimate earnings equations of various migrants groups.JEL Classification: J61, J68, H59, F22

Fiscal Revenues and Commitment in Immigration Amnesties

“…Gang and Yun (2007) discuss the productivity enhancing effects of a legalization when immigrants are allowed to move from the underground economy to the formal sector. Karlson and Katz (2003) suggest that illegal immigration followed by a probabilistic amnesty can be used as a tool to select high ability immigrants and get rid of less able ones.…”

“…EW assume that the probability of legalization p i is exogenous and obtain an incentive constraint equivalent to (6). This paper shows that p i can be determined endogenously as a Nash equilibrium.…”

“…In conclusion, the lack of commitment seems inevitable in immigration amnesties: it reduces the fiscal revenues and discourages many immigrants from coming forward 6 . Immigration amnesties turn out to be intrinsically inefficient.…”

Do Regularization Programs for Illegal Immigrants Have a Magnet Effect? Evidence from Spain

“…() who, using a descriptive analysis, concluded that it had no effect on the illegal migration received from Mexico. Gang and Yun () developed a theoretical model to determine the effects that amnesties have on the quantity of migration received by the host country, and also studied the effects of the IRCA on the salaries of immigrants.…”

The why, when, and how of immigration amnesties

“…The showed that a rich country can use this policy mix to attract cheap foreign workers while avoiding low ability migrants, who, once amnestied, become a burden on the public purse. Finaly, Gang and Yun (2005) reviewed the role immigration amnesties have played in US immigration policy, placing them in the context of similar programs embarked upon by other nations. The theory of amnesties suggests rent seeking, bargaining, and costs as reasons for a country offering an amnesty, often in conjunction with increased border controls, internal enforcement and employer penalties.…”