The why, when, and how of immigration amnesties

Epstein, Gil S.; Weiss, Avi

doi:10.1007/s00148-009-0280-5

Cited by 37 publications

(31 citation statements)

References 22 publications

(23 reference statements)

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“…Potential fiscal gains are crucial in any kind of amnesty, and governments usually proceed only when the expected revenues are considerable. Different authorslike Epstein and Weiss (2011), and Levinson (2005)-acknowledge the importance of this issue. In addition, immigration amnesties are used to raise supplementary funds by charging application fees and other costs: for example, payments to social security are one of the most frequent requirements…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In such a case legalization is uncertain, and immigrants apply only if their expected utility is sufficiently high. Working in the direction suggested by EW, 5 we have developed this argument in a full-fledged gametheoretical framework, which determines the probability of legalization as a Nash equilibrium.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…either regularized by being given some type of residence permit, or expelled (Epstein and Weiss, 2011). …”

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confidence: 99%

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Fiscal Revenues and Commitment in Immigration Amnesties

Magris

Russo

2016

European Journal of Political Economy

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Reasons to grant immigration amnesties include the intention to reduce the weight of the informal sector and the attempt to identify employers of undocumented workers. However, it is incontestable that potential fiscal gains are important: tax revenues are crucial in all kinds of amnesties. Nevertheless, over the last 30 years 24% of applications have been rejected. It is still unexplained why governments accept this loss of fiscal base. We argue that applying for amnesty is basically selfincrimination, and that immigration-averse governments have an incentive to exploit the applications to identify and expel illegal workers. In our Nash equilibrium only applicants with the highest income are granted amnesty, and the poorest immigrants do not apply. Thus, fiscal revenues are sub-optimal and amnesties are an inefficient way to make illegal workers come forward.JEL classification: J61, J68, H59

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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Fiscal Revenues and Commitment in Immigration Amnesties

Magris

Russo

2016

European Journal of Political Economy

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“…Formal theoretical models are very scarce. The literature includes papers by Epstein and Weiss (2001), Chau (2001Chau ( , 2003, and Karlson and Katz (2003).…”

Section: Economic Theory Of Immigration Amnestymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Epstein and Weiss (2001) discuss this in some detail, offering several explanations, including: (2a) immediate legalization of successful entrants will affect the flow of migrants; (2b) legalized migrants cannot be deported, so the recipient country may prefer illegal immigrants to allow for a deportation; (2c) there may be benefits from having workers confined to certain sectors, which can be guaranteed in a democratic society only if they are illegal (Hillman and Weiss, 1999), or from having them largely unemployed for efficiency wage purposes (Epstein and Hillman, 2000); (2d) It is easier to deny illegal entrants income transfers of various sorts, and to discourage dependent family members from joining them.…”

Section: Aspects Of the Economic Theory Of Immigration Amnestymentioning

confidence: 99%

Immigration Amnesty and Immigrant's Earnings

Gang¹,

Yun²

Research in Labor Economics

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in ABSTRACTWe review the role immigration amnesties have played in US immigration policy, placing them in the context of similar programs embarked upon by other nations. The theory of amnesties suggests rent-seeking, bargaining, and costs as reasons for a country offering an amnesty, often in conjunction with increased border controls, internal enforcement and employer penalties. We model an immigration amnesty in which the destination country has a formal sector employing only legal immigrants, an informal sector employing both legal and illegal immigrants, and open unemployment. The model focuses on the productivity enhancing effects of legalization, and establishes specific conditions under which unemployment, the informal sector and the formal sectors increase/decrease in size. Building on these insights, our empirical work examines Mexican migration to the US. We study who are migrants; among migrants, who are legalized via IRCA, and who are legalized via sponsorship of family or employer. Furthermore, to measure the impact of amnesty on welfare of migrants, we estimate earnings equations of various migrants groups.JEL Classification: J61, J68, H59, F22

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Reshaping Migrant Labour Market Geographies: Local Regularisations and the Informal Economy

Visser

2016

Population Space and Place

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Regularisation remains a strategic site for studying the political economy of migrant socio-economic incorporation. Research suggests that immigrant regularisation policies improve labour market opportunities for undocumented migrant workers in host societiesparticularly those engaged in the informal economy. However, research on regularisation remains focused on nationallevel policy efforts, despite increased political activity by sub-national levels of government on immigration issues across migrant-receiving societies. This article identifies and examines local migrant labour market regularisationsa new political geography of labour market regulationand explores the potential of these policies to influence labour market mobility and opportunity for irregular migrants in the US. Using data on 5,528 policy ordinances across 3,067 city, counties, and states, implementation trends across four local migrant labour market regularisation policy domains were analysed for the time period 2001-2014. Case studies of local-level government activism within each policy domain are also presented. Findings indicate that the implementation of local migrant labour market regularisations in the US has become increasingly unfavourable towards migrant workers and that within these new political geographies, local governments are emerging as central actors in shaping migrant labour market opportunities. The article concludes by reflecting on the implications these new political geographies present for the economic incorporation of irregular migrants and their role in constructing a new scalar reality of migrant labour market regulation.

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The why, when, and how of immigration amnesties

Cited by 37 publications

References 22 publications

Fiscal Revenues and Commitment in Immigration Amnesties

Fiscal Revenues and Commitment in Immigration Amnesties

Immigration Amnesty and Immigrant's Earnings

Reshaping Migrant Labour Market Geographies: Local Regularisations and the Informal Economy

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