Abstract:In the context of the highly contested discourse of posthumanism, this essay examines Mark Hansen's attempt to give a robust account of technology in its extra-linguistic dimension by evincing an '"originary" coupling of the human and the technical' that grounds experience as such (Hansen 2006a: 9). Specifically, I argue that Hansen's perspective is haunted by the representational logic that it moves against. In this, I do not repudiate Hansen's argument as such, but rather reject one of its central underlying implications: that the extra-discursive materiality of technology might be accessed, linguistically, without attaching a meaning to it that is foreign to this materiality. To this end, the essay begins with an examination of technesis as it is initially developed by Hansen, demonstrating the necessity from which it sprang, the contribution that Hansen's reading makes, and its ultimate limitations. From here, the essay articulates Hansen's argument for an affective topology of the senses, corroborating the increased importance of digital technologies in this perspective through a brief comparison of Roberto Lazzarini's 'skulls' (as read by Hansen) and my own piece 'Sound.' Finally, this comparison pivots the essay towards a critical analysis of Hansen's account of primary tactility that demonstrates its dependence on the (representational) logic of language. In closing, then, I argue that what is accomplished by Hansen's putting-into-discourse of technesis is, paradoxically, a re-staging of the constitutive ambivalence of deconstruction that reinvigorates the posthumanist elements of that discourse.Keywords: Affect, posthuman, performativity, media theory, art, autopoiesis, sound "The potential of deconstructive analysis lies not in the simple recognition of the inevitability of exclusions, but in insisting upon accountability for the particular exclusions that are enacted and in taking up the responsibility to perpetually contest and rework the boundaries" (Barad 1998: 104).Today, the signs of technological posthumanism have become so ubiquitous that most of us, on most occasions, have ceased to take notice. Indeed, our navigations through diverse realities and our negotiations with aggressive technological couplings are no longer even really remarkable: email and video-chats, certainly, but also medical imaging, online classes, virtual exercise routines, and complex relational databases are all part of our daily lives. As a result, our perceptive apparatuses are constantly tuned to diverse and often contradictory frequencies, but in a way that tends to play out any incongruities as part of what and who we are as humans. Indeed, many of us are more likely to feel the absence of these technologies than their presence: for example, I frequently feel a visceral frustration at not having Internet access while driving; a question pops into my head and-before becoming aware of my physical situation-I can feel my body reaching for the Internet to answer it. What feels incongruent is not having the Intern...