Impact of inductive integrated voltage regulator on the power attack vulnerability of encryption engines: A simulation study

Kar, Monodeep; Lie, Denny; Wolf, Marilyn; De, Vivek; Mukhopadhyay, Saibal

doi:10.1109/cicc.2014.6946135

Cited by 15 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…3.6a. The above analysis was published in [86]. It shows that IVR transformations reduce the correlation between the load current signature and the input current signatures, significantly.…”

Section: Correlation Transfer Functionmentioning

confidence: 95%

“…The MTD increased by 16x compared to the baseline design. Although the absolute value of the correlation for the correct key has decreased in an IVR-AES system, the correlation ratio remains high, indicating that calculating absolute correlation value [86] is not enough to ensure attack protection. Therefore, it is important to consider security-aware design strategies to improve robustness.…”

Section: Cpa On Aes Enginementioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Exploiting Fully Integrated Inductive Voltage Regulators to Improve Side Channel Resistance of Encryption Engines

Kar

Singh

Mathew

et al. 2016

Proceedings of the 2016 International Symposium on Low Power Electronics and Design

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Section: Correlation Transfer Functionmentioning

confidence: 95%

Section: Cpa On Aes Enginementioning

confidence: 99%

Exploiting Fully Integrated Inductive Voltage Regulators to Improve Side Channel Resistance of Encryption Engines

Kar

Singh

Mathew

et al. 2016

Proceedings of the 2016 International Symposium on Low Power Electronics and Design

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“…The third category of protection reduces the power sidechannel leakage information by isolating the supply from the encryption engine. It includes switched capacitor techniques [16], [17], [18] and integrated voltage regulator (IVR) based implementations [19], [20], [21], [22]. The switched capacitor current equalizer module proposed by Tokunaga et al [17] demonstrated Power SCA immunity, however, it resulted in 2 performance degradation and 33% power overhead.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The switched capacitor current equalizer module proposed by Tokunaga et al [17] demonstrated Power SCA immunity, however, it resulted in 2 performance degradation and 33% power overhead. The impact of package parasitic and integrated buck converters on power SCA vulnerability have been analyzed in [11], [19]. Another concept is to degrade the performance of IVR such that supply current has lesser correlation with the AES current.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

High efficiency power side-channel attack immunity using noise injection in attenuated signature domain

Das¹,

Maity²,

Nasir

et al. 2017

2017 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST)

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With the advancement of technology in the last few decades, leading to the widespread availability of miniaturized sensors and internet-connected things (IoT), security of electronic devices has become a top priority. Side-channel attack (SCA) is one of the prominent methods to break the security of an encryption system by exploiting the information leaked from the physical devices. Correlational power attack (CPA) is an efficient power side-channel attack technique, which analyses the correlation between the estimated and measured supply current traces to extract the secret key. The existing countermeasures to the power attacks are mainly based on reducing the SNR of the leaked data, or introducing large overhead using techniques like power balancing. This paper presents an attenuated signature AES (AS-AES), which resists SCA with minimal noise current overhead. AS-AES uses a shunt low-drop-out (LDO) regulator to suppress the AES current signature by  in the supply current traces. The shunt LDO has been fabricated and validated in 130 nm CMOS technology. System-level implementation of the AS-AES along with noise injection, shows that the system remains secure even after encryptions, with  reduction in power overhead compared to that of noise addition alone. Figure 1: Traditional AES and Proposed AS-AES with noise injection: A comparative Overview (I Ov : overhead current) ≪ ≪ Traditional AES Modified AS-AES GND AES Engine GND AES EngineSignature Attenuating Hardware (SAH) I N1 I N2

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Towards Securing Low-Power Digital Circuits with Ultra-Low-Voltage Vdd Randomizers

Kamel

Streel

Pozo

et al. 2016

Security, Privacy, and Applied Cryptography Engineering

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Impact of inductive integrated voltage regulator on the power attack vulnerability of encryption engines: A simulation study

Cited by 15 publications

References 6 publications

Exploiting Fully Integrated Inductive Voltage Regulators to Improve Side Channel Resistance of Encryption Engines

Exploiting Fully Integrated Inductive Voltage Regulators to Improve Side Channel Resistance of Encryption Engines

High efficiency power side-channel attack immunity using noise injection in attenuated signature domain

Towards Securing Low-Power Digital Circuits with Ultra-Low-Voltage Vdd Randomizers

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