Impacts of decision sequences on a random yield supply chain with a service level requirement

He, Bo; Li, Guo; Liu, Mengqi

doi:10.1007/s10479-016-2275-4

Cited by 13 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…Chen et al [46] characterize the optimal decision strategy for the supplier and the retailer with and without the bidirectional option contract, and examine the effect of the bidirectional option contract and service requirement on the supply chain. He et al [47] formulate several game-theoretic models with a service requirement. In addition, under these models, they compare firms' equilibrium order/production quantity and profits.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Supply Chain Coordination with a Risk-Averse Retailer and the Call Option Contract in the Presence of a Service Requirement

et al. 2021

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This paper investigates a supply chain consisting of a single risk-neutral supplier and a single risk-averse retailer with the call option contract and a service requirement, where the retailer’s objective is to maximize the Conditional Value-at-Risk about profit. The optimal ordering quantity of the retailer and the optimal production quantity of the supplier are derived with the call option contract in the presence of a service requirement. Furthermore, by investigating the effect of the service level and the risk aversion on the supply chain, it is found that the retailer’s optimal Conditional Value-at-Risk is non-increasing in the service requirement and increasing in the risk aversion, while the supplier’s optimal expected profit is non-decreasing in the service and decreasing in the risk aversion. In addition, this paper demonstrates the impact of contract parameters on the service-constrained supply chain, and finds that the retailer’s optimal Conditional Value-at-Risk may be increasing, constant or decreasing in unit exercise price. Finally, with the call option contract, a distribution-free coordination condition is derived to achieve the Pareto improvement under Conditional Value-at-Risk criterion in the presence of a service requirement.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Supply Chain Coordination with a Risk-Averse Retailer and the Call Option Contract in the Presence of a Service Requirement

et al. 2021

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“…Pan and So [30] and Li et al [26] analyse the interactions among the assembler and suppliers in their procurement decisions in a random yield production system. He et al [20] study the impacts of decision sequences on a random yield supply chain with a service level constraint. Different methods are used in the literature to describe supply randomness; two of the most widely used forms are the additive and multiplicative forms.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coordination for pull and push contracts in decentralized system with uncertain supply

Zhang

Chu

2021

RAIRO-Oper. Res.

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This paper investigates how a random supply can influence management decisions under pull and push contracts in a decentralized supply chain with one supplier and one retailer. We suppose that the supplier faces yield uncertainty, and we adopt game models to analyse the supply chain members’ decisions (i.e., wholesale price and order quantity) under the two commonly used contracts. Specifically, we analyse the revenue sharing mechanism and buyback mechanism with pull and push contracts, respectively, and find that the buyback contract can efficiently coordinate the supply chain with push contract, while the revenue sharing contract cannot improve the performance with a pull contract. Then we design a modified revenue sharing contract that introduces a subsidy for excess inventory and shows that for the pull case, the proposed mechanism can coordinate the supply chain effectively. Finally, the analysis results are displayed intuitively by numerical cases.

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“…In most literature related to oligopolistic competition, there is a basic assumption underlying that the production process is deterministic and a firm's target quantity always equals the final output. However, many manufacturing‐related firms suffer from yield uncertainty, and the final output might derive from the firm's target production quantities (Yano and Lee, ; Wang and Gerchak, ; Yan and Wang, ; Çetinkaya et al., ; He et al., ). Typical examples with yield uncertainty can be found in many manufacturing industries such as semiconductor production.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Investigating remanufacturing competition with yield uncertainty on market share, profit, and consumer surplus

Zhu

Wang

Pei

et al. 2019

Int Trans Operational Res

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Remanufacturing has been recognized both in literature and practice because of its greenness and cost saving. Since the reproduction processes could be affected by uncertain factors, remanufacturing is much more complex than producing new products. To investigate how yield uncertainty and market competition affect remanufacturing decisions, we compare the results under three classical market scenarios with random yield, that is, (a) Nash-Cournot, (b) monopoly, and (c) Stackelberg-Cournot. On comparing the expected remanufacturing scale, expected profit, and consumer surplus, it shows that as the number of remanufacturers increases, the planned collection quantity of a single remanufacturer decreases, while the total expected market output increases. Furthermore, we find that the largest expected profit and expected consumer surplus brought by market scenarios depend on a threshold remanufacturer number. We also relax the assumptions and extend our model to consider the scenario of m leaders and n − m followers in a Stackelberg game. It is interesting to find that the first-mover advantage in profit and market share of the leader remanufacturer would be challenged when the number of leader remanufacturers is no less than 2. The results can be potentially useful for managerial decisions and environmental administrations.

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Impacts of decision sequences on a random yield supply chain with a service level requirement

Cited by 13 publications

References 33 publications

Supply Chain Coordination with a Risk-Averse Retailer and the Call Option Contract in the Presence of a Service Requirement

Supply Chain Coordination with a Risk-Averse Retailer and the Call Option Contract in the Presence of a Service Requirement

Coordination for pull and push contracts in decentralized system with uncertain supply

Investigating remanufacturing competition with yield uncertainty on market share, profit, and consumer surplus

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