Imperfect Information and Strikes: An Analysis of Canadian Experience, 1967–82

Cousineau, Jean-Michel; Lacroix, Robert

doi:10.1177/001979398603900305

Cited by 11 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…However, using Canadian manufacturing data for 1962-1982, Cousineau and Lacroix (1986 are unable to find a significant relationship between strike probability and joint strike costs (as proxied by the coefficient of variation of the ratio of inventories to sales). Whereas, Kennan (1980b) found some empirical support that strike duration is directly related to unemployment insurance benefits (which would decrease strike costs), other attempts to test the theory's predictions produced mixed results.…”

Section: I2 Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 94%

How Asymmetrically Increasing Joint Strike Costs Need Not Lead to Fewer Strikes

Pantsios

Polachek

2017

Atl Econ J

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in How Asymmetrically Increasing Joint Strike Costs Need Not Lead to Fewer Strikes APrIl 2017Any opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in this series may include views on policy, but IZA takes no institutional policy positions. The IZA research network is committed to the IZA Guiding Principles of Research Integrity. The IZA Institute of Labor Economics is an independent economic research institute that conducts research in labor economics and offers evidence-based policy advice on labor market issues. Supported by the Deutsche Post Foundation, IZA runs the world's largest network of economists, whose research aims to provide answers to the global labor market challenges of our time. Our key objective is to build bridges between academic research, policymakers and society. IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author. How Asymmetrically Increasing Joint Strike Costs Need Not Lead to Fewer Strikes *The "joint costs" model states that the incentive to strike is inversely related to the total costs associated with workers' and firms' strike activities. Not only has this model been tested with mixed results, but also the joint costs model is problematic in explaining several stylized facts in the strike literature because higher strike costs do not always yield a lower incidence of strike activity. This paper illustrates how the joint cost model can yield these counterintuitive results. It shows that strike incidence need not decrease when joint strike costs increase. The innovation is to raise union and firm joint strike costs in an asymmetric way. Increasing a particular side's strike costs necessarily decreases its incentive to strike.However, in response, the other side's incentive can increase, since under a number of circumstances it holds out with a higher probability in order to collect the relatively larger expected rents coming about because the other side's implicit threat point decreases. To illustrate this, we model contract negotiations as a simple one-period game. (No need for more complex repeated games such as attrition since our point is only to show as simply as possible why the joint-costs model yields ambiguous results.) We use standard Hicksian concession curves to der...

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Section: I2 Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 94%

How Asymmetrically Increasing Joint Strike Costs Need Not Lead to Fewer Strikes

Pantsios

Polachek

2017

Atl Econ J

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“…In collective bargaining, these critical aspects are bargaining power (Leap and Grigsby, 1986;Svejnar, 1986;Cousineau and Lacroix, 1986;Martin, 1992), employers' ability to pay (Hayes, 1984;Cramton and Tracy, 2003) and norms concerning fair outcomes (Hyman and Brough, 1975;Frank, 1984;Rees, 1993). As negotiators aim to overcome their uncertainty regarding such aspects, they turn to external information that may serve as a proxy.…”

Section: Theory and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Ashenfelter andJohnson, 1969, Mauro, 1982) and different types of bargaining units (c.f. Cousineau and Lacroix, 1986). The second goal of our study was therefore to shed light on a second question: how can differences in the reported influence of external information between negotiators be explained by the characteristics of the negotiators and bargaining units?…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Influence of External Information on Collective Bargaining: Survey Evidence of Union and Firm Negotiators in the Netherlands

Lehr

Akkerman

Torenvlied

2015

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External information is generally assumed to greatly affect collective bargaining, yet rigorous empirical investigations of the influence of this information on union and firm negotiators are surprisingly scarce. Comprehensive standardized survey data measuring the influence of external information on negotiators in the Netherlands were analyzed to reveal the extent to which negotiators were influenced by different types of external information and how differences in these influences could be explained by the characteristics of negotiators and bargaining units. the findings indicate that the influence of external information a) increased with proximity of the information source; b) was usually greater for union negotiators than for firm negotiators; and in some cases c) modestly increased with negotiator experience; and d) was greater in company bargaining than in sector bargaining.

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“…: 146, 147). In this theory of imperfect information (Cousineau and Lacroix 1986), strikes occur when economic conditions-and we could add political conditions-are uncertain. Uncertainty makes the divergence of workers' and employers' expectations more likely.…”

Section: Explanations Of Strikesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strikes as Sequences of Interaction: The American Strike Wave of 1886

Biggs¹

2002

Social Science History

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The American Strike Wave of 1886 Theories of strikes-or any kind of conflict-are theories of interaction. Marxists envisage class conflict as a dialectical struggle between proletariat and bourgeoisie. Neoclassical economists imagine strikes as an unintended consequence of bargaining between rational actors. The tumult of class conflict is far removed from the quiet of rational bargaining, yet these theories are alike in this respect: strikes ensue from dyadic interaction. Adding political authorities to the dyad of workers and employers extends interaction to three sets of actors.

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Imperfect Information and Strikes: An Analysis of Canadian Experience, 1967–82

Cited by 11 publications

References 10 publications

How Asymmetrically Increasing Joint Strike Costs Need Not Lead to Fewer Strikes

How Asymmetrically Increasing Joint Strike Costs Need Not Lead to Fewer Strikes

The Influence of External Information on Collective Bargaining: Survey Evidence of Union and Firm Negotiators in the Netherlands

Strikes as Sequences of Interaction: The American Strike Wave of 1886

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