Imperfect Information and Strikes: An Analysis of Canadian Experience, 1967-82

Japanese firms often attempt to influence the process and outcomes of wage negotiation by sharing confidential business information with their unions and employees through the joint consultation system. In this study, using a unique survey of Japanese joint consultation committees conducted in 1981, the author examines the effects of information sharing on the process and outcomes of wage negotiation. The results show that when firms engaged in increased information sharing, negotiation processes were shorter and easier, and unions tended to demand and accept lower wage increases. In contrast, a similar study performed in the United States found that information sharing increased labor's bargaining power.

Section: Industrial and Labor Relations Review Wage Negotiation And Imentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Industrial and Labor Relations Review Wage Negotiation And Imentioning

confidence: 99%

Information Sharing and Collective Bargaining in Japan: Effects on Wage Negotiation

Morishima¹

1991

“…The seven market variables are MARKET SHARE, which is the company's share of total industry sales in the primary market in which the primary product of the " Under the neoclassical model, it should also bear a positive association-again, because it is viewed as being related to negotiating process complexity (see Cousineau and Lacroix 1986). 12 Both WORKFLOW RIGIDITY and AUTOMATION are adopted from the Aston instrument (Hickson et al 1969) and have been widely employed in organizational research (most recently, in Lincoln and Kalleberg [1990]).…”

Section: Empirical Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For example,Gramm (1986),Cousineau and Lacroix (1986), andGunderson et al (1986) all employ bargaining unit size. In this study, a number of measures of size were obtained.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Strikes as Collective Voice: A Behavioral Analysis of Strike Activity

Godard¹

1992

This paper outlines a "collective voice" approach for examining the behavioral determinants of variation in strike activity at the organizational level. The author argues that strikes should be viewed primarily as expressions of worker discontent rather than a result of imperfect or asymmetrical information. An analysis of survey data collected from 1 12 Canadian firms in 1980-81 indicates that managerial practices, operations size and technology, product market structure and conditions, union politics, and various other factors that influence the behavioral context of negotiations are significantly related to days lost due to strike activity. These findings are generally consistent with predictions from the collective voice approach. OVER the past decade, the quantitative literature on strike activity has been dominated by neoclassical economic models that attribute strikes primarily to imperfect or asymmetrical information. This literature does a great deal to advance our understanding of how economic and organizational conditions such as unemployment and bargaining structure affect the strategic interactions of negotiators and how this influence is reflected in strike activity (Franzosi 1989). But it fails to adequately account for sociological, psychological, and political considerations forming the behavioral context within which negotiations occur, despite a long history of behavioral analysis in the strike literature (Godard 1992c).

“…Mauro (1982) suggested that strikes result from firms and unions using different factors in making demands. Work by Tracy (1986Tracy ( , 1987, Cousineau and Lacroix (1986), and others has shown that strikes might be used to elicit private information from the other party.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Impact of Bargainer Experience on Teacher Strikes

Montgomery¹,

Benedict²

1989

Using data on Pennsylvania public schools for the period 1978-84, the authors investigate the effects of bargainer experience on the frequency and duration of strikes. They find that increases in the negotiation experience of the chief or principal bargainer on either side, as well as increases in the experience of the two bargainers combined, reduce both the frequency and duration of strikes, suggesting that experienced bargainers are more adept than inexperienced bargainers at learning the minimum payoffs demanded by their opponents and conveying their own true positions. Also, strikes are less likely to occur the more equal the experience levels of the two chief bargainers.T HERE is widespread interest in the determinants of strike behavior over time and across industries in the United States. Although the estimated output loss due to strikes is small, the perception remains that strikes are a major problem in industrial relations (Neumann and Reder 1984). Strike activity is used as a barometer of the labor relations climate and can affect firm productivity, labor