Imperfect information and the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis

Bredemeier, Christian

doi:10.1007/s11127-013-0072-z

Cited by 11 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…A direct test of the MR hypothesis should use policy outcomes as dependent variables. Bredemeier (2014) theoretically discusses those determinants of rising inequality that can account for a lower demand for redistribution. The paper argues that when the income of the poor increases, the perceived inequality decreases (even though the mean-to-median ratio might actually increase) and the demand for redistribution goes down.…”

Section: Related Observationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Biased Perceptions of Income Inequality and Redistribution

Engelhardt

Wagener

2014

SSRN Journal

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When based on perceived rather than o n objective income distributions, the Meltzer-Richards hypothesis and the POUM hypothesis work quite well empirically: there exists a positive link between perceived inequality or perceived upward mobility and the extent of redistribution in democratic regimes -though such a link does not exist when objective measures of inequality and social mobility are used. These observations highlight that political preferences and choices might depend more on perceptions than on factual data.

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Section: Related Observationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Biased Perceptions of Income Inequality and Redistribution

Engelhardt

Wagener

2014

SSRN Journal

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“…Other papers, such as Bredemeier () and De Freitas (), have also obtained this result, but they propose different explanations. While Bredemeier () focuses on tax avoidance with imperfect information, De Freitas () focuses on the incidence of direct and indirect taxes on the size of the underground economy.…”

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confidence: 64%

Fairness in tax compliance: A political competition model

Solano-García

2017

J Public Economic Theory

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This paper analyzes the political economy of income redistribution when voters are concerned about fairness in tax compliance. We consider a two‐stage model where there is a two‐party competition over the tax rate and over the intensity of the tax enforcement policy in the first stage, and voters decide about their level of tax compliance in the second stage. We find that if the concern about fairness in tax compliance is high enough, a liberal middle‐income majority of voters may block any income redistribution policy. Alternatively, we find an equilibrium in which the preferences of the median voter are ignored in favor of a coalition formed by a group of relatively poor voters and the richest voters. In this equilibrium income redistribution prevails with no tax enforcement.

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“…Although the Gini coefficient is a more common and precise metric of inequality, local‐level Gini data are not available for California in ways that can be aggregated to utility service areas. The mean‐to‐median income ratio is a useful proxy in absence of finer metrics (Birdsall & Meyer, 2015), and generally reflects public perceptions of income distribution (Bredemeier, 2014; Meltzer & Richard, 1983; Perotti, 1992). More densely concentrated populations might increase the likelihood that incidents of water waste are observed at random; meanwhile, there might be less outdoor water use and water waste for people to observe when population density is high.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Public Water Waste Reporting: Contextual Correlates and Conservation Outcomes

Zhang

Teodoro

Switzer

2021

Water Resources Research

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The success of water conservation restrictions depends in part on governments' capacity to monitor water use. Inviting the general public to report instances of water waste is a potential means of expanding capacity to monitor and enforce water use. Does the general public engage in such "participatory surveillance?" How does participation in public monitoring vary across communities? Is participatory surveillance associated with the achievement of water conservation goals?This study explores the contextual correlates and implications of public responses to participatory surveillance as part of a regime of water restrictions adopted in response to a drought emergency. Our empirical subject is water conservation in California communities during that state's 2014-2017 drought. In response to a severe water shortage, California's governor ordered utilities to reduce potable water consumption and introduced a series of statewide measures to promote conservation. For instance, California authorities prohibited washing down driveways and sidewalks, outdoor irrigation that causes excess runoff, using a hose to wash a motor vehicle (unless the hose is fitted with a shut-off nozzle), and using potable water in a fountain or decorative water feature, unless the water is recirculated. As part of these efforts, state and local agencies established telephone hotlines and websites for the public to report water waste and violations of drought restrictions anonymously. After a complaint was made, utilities proceeded with a series of escalating enforcement steps, including informal education, formal warning, and monetary penalties. That is, the governments actively invited the public to participate in surveillance of their neighbors as a means of promoting water conservation. The people responded with gusto: over the course of the drought emergency (August 2014 to April 2017), Californians reported more than 485,000 water waste complaints. The California communities provide an extraordinary opportunity to explore participatory surveillance as a means of managing a drought emergency.To that end, we analyze monthly water waste reporting and conservation across 408 water utilities in California during the drought emergency. To preview our results, we find that besides characteristics of water

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Imperfect information and the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis

Cited by 11 publications

References 41 publications

Biased Perceptions of Income Inequality and Redistribution

Biased Perceptions of Income Inequality and Redistribution

Fairness in tax compliance: A political competition model

Public Water Waste Reporting: Contextual Correlates and Conservation Outcomes

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