Implementation of Nash bargaining solutions with non-convexity

Qin, Cheng Zhong; Tan, Guofu; Wong, Adam Chi Leung

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2019.02.016

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 10 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The paper obtains the egalitarian bargaining solution as the long-run norm if there are intentional biases (where a deviation to a different strategy depends on the last payoff received); this result is to be contrasted with Young (1993), which obtains the Nash solution when deviations do not exhibit such a dependence. Qin et al (2019) implements selections of the Nash set (multi-valued Nash solutions) in the absence of convexity of the feasible set of utilities. Mizukami and Wakayama (2020) investigates implementation in dominant strategies and finds a negative result: along with welfarism, it is equivalent to the class of dictatorial solutions.…”

Section: Other Solutions To Pure Bargaining Problemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sixty-seven years of the Nash program: time for retirement?

Serrano

2020

SERIEs

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The Nash program is an important research agenda initiated in Nash (Econometrica 21:128-140, 1953) in order to bridge the gap between the noncooperative and cooperative counterparts of game theory. The program is thus turning sixty-seven years old, but I will argue it is not ready for retirement, as it is full of energy and one can still propose important directions to be explored. This paper completes and updates previous surveys, and suggests several directions for future research.

show abstract

Section: Other Solutions To Pure Bargaining Problemsmentioning

confidence: 99%