Implications of International Law for a Future Arms Trade Treaty

Bellal, Annyssa; Casey-Maslen, Stuart; Giacca, Gilles

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2231378

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 3 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…182 As they cannot become parties to IHL, IHRL or IEL treaties, NSAGs "may feel they lack 'ownership' over international norms". 183 Compliance can be improved by enabling NSAGs to issue their own commitments to respect environmental norms, as this would "increase their sense of ownership over" the latter. 184 For instance, a unilateral declaration provides the opportunity for NSAGs to express a specific commitment to abide by environmental norms in the form of a public statement.…”

Section: Methods and Actors Of Engagement To Improve Non-state Armed Groups' Compliance With The Legal And Policy Framework Protecting Thmentioning

confidence: 99%

Greener insurgencies? Engaging non-State armed groups for the protection of the natural environment during non-international armed conflicts

Bourdonnaye¹

2020

Int. rev. Red Cross

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

As belligerent parties, non-State armed groups (NSAGs) contribute to environmental damage in non-international armed conflicts. Drawing from the actual practice and doctrine of NSAGs, this article unpacks the legal and policy framework for engaging them on the protection of the environment. It analyzes the international humanitarian law rules protecting the environment binding on NSAGs. To improve environmental protection, a model of environmental responsibilities under international human rights law and international environmental law based on the NSAG's level of territorial control is suggested, as a matter of policy. This article then explores how to engage NSAGs on the legal and policy framework identified and proposes a model unilateral declaration for the protection of the natural environment.

show abstract

Section: Methods and Actors Of Engagement To Improve Non-state Armed Groups' Compliance With The Legal And Policy Framework Protecting Thmentioning

confidence: 99%

Greener insurgencies? Engaging non-State armed groups for the protection of the natural environment during non-international armed conflicts

Bourdonnaye¹

2020

Int. rev. Red Cross

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…There must be not only an evaluation of the recipient of the transfer. According to the doctrine, the obligation of observance of general international law, which also refers to UN Security Council's resolutions which establish embargoes for arms, hangs not only on the State exporter, thus violating an erga omnes obligation, but also on destination (Bellal, Casey-Maslen, Giacca, 2012).…”

Section: Responsibility Profiles and Compliance With Arms Transfer Ag...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Art. 58 DARIO, activities of international organizations and complicity of States in the global international law

King¹

2023

AYIL

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The subject of this paper is the complicity of the State in the offense committed by an international organization in the exercise of its regulatory function. The framework in which the case in question unfolds logically presupposes that the complicit State is part of the agreement of the body which is the author of the main conduct. We would try to examination of a question that takes on a preliminary character with respect to the one we intend to address in the following pages. This is the possibility that the main crime is supplemented by a regulatory act. We are also interested to examine the conditions under which the concurrence in the resolution of a third degree legislative act must be qualified in terms of complicity pursuant to art. 58 DARIO

show abstract

“…66 This observation demonstrates that contemporary efforts to promote the "ownership" of the humanitarian norms by armed groups are not only useful to increase armed groups' compliance with international humanitarian law, but also useful to achieve their accountability. 67 Current studies have shown that armed groups can take ownership of humanitarian norms in different ways, a few of which will be mentioned here. First it has been demonstrated that there is an important value in consulting armed groups about the need for new norms, even though they are not formal actors in the norm creation process.…”

Section: Towards An Accountability Of Armed Groups?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Armed Groups and Procedural Accountability: A Roadmap for Further Thought

Fortin

2017

Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This chapter investigates the meaning of the term "accountability", as it is used in policy discussions surrounding armed groups. It takes a detailed look at literature from public administration on the concept of procedural accountability and applies it to the various accountability mechanisms that evaluate the conduct of armed groups against international norms. In doing so, the chapter points out some of the shortcomings of some of these accountability mechanisms. It ends by examining some of the more innovative accountability models, such as the process created by Geneva Call and the ad hoc processes created by the UNAMA field office in Afghanistan vis-à-vis the Taliban.

show abstract

Implications of International Law for a Future Arms Trade Treaty

Cited by 4 publications

References 3 publications

Greener insurgencies? Engaging non-State armed groups for the protection of the natural environment during non-international armed conflicts

Greener insurgencies? Engaging non-State armed groups for the protection of the natural environment during non-international armed conflicts

Art. 58 DARIO, activities of international organizations and complicity of States in the global international law

Armed Groups and Procedural Accountability: A Roadmap for Further Thought

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About