The study indicates that public-private partnerships (PPPs) can play "strategic", "practical", or "regulative" roles by making use of "instrumental", "institutional", and "normative" approaches in tackling political issues between countries. PPPs have often been discussed in studies of urban development, service provision, health care, and so on, but they have rarely been analyzed in terms of international relations and political problems on global environmental issues. This study takes an environmental problem-Sino-US energy and climate change cooperation-as a case study to inspect the possible roles and approaches of PPPs. Sino-US cooperation has been launched such as under the Strategic & Economic Dialogue (S&ED) by both administrations, which has significantly contributed to their reconciliation of domestic abatement policies in climate change, environmental protection, and energy. The establishment of schemes such as the Ten-Year Framework for Cooperation on Energy and Environment (TYF), the EcoPartnerships, and wide-ranging dialogues and initiatives on clean energy and clean vehicles, in which both public and private actors participate, are among the important approaches of facilitating bilateral cooperation. The study concludes that these schemes have played strategic and practical roles in strengthening the degree of mutual trust and in facilitating the progress of cooperation, although more investigations are needed to considerate their regulative roles. The application of instrumental, institutional, and normative approaches have been observed through the implementation of the TYF and EcoPartnerships.Keywords: Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), Sino-US relations, Strategic & Economic Dialogue (S&ED), Eco-Partnerships, energy efficiency, and climate change, public-private partnerships (ppps), S&ED, climate change, sino-us relations, energy efficiency
IntroductionPublic-private partnerships (PPPs) have been indicated as a new type of tool for transnational governance that can increase problem-solving capacity, that is, cost effectiveness and democratic accountability, which can be regarded as legitimacy (Börzel & Risse, 2005, p. 195;Klitgaard, 2011;Kouwenhoven, 1993; Porter, 2005, p. 222). Börzel and Risse argued that both public and non-state (here we use private) actors can both be involved in governance under a non-hierarchical structure. Non-hierarchical governance, according to Börzel and Risse, can be formed and sustain itself by boosting positive incentives, bargaining, arguing, and non-manipulative persuasion among actors. Thus, compared with hierarchical governance, private actors are better able to delegate public functions, to establish networks and partnerships, or to behave under corporatism. Private actors also introduce norms and problem-solving approaches to international affairs, such as "benchmarking", "race to the top", "risk management", and so on (Fraser, 2002; Porter, 2005, p. 220;Rabe, 2006;Tews, Busch, & Jörgens, 2003; Wynne, 1992; Yale University and Columbia University, 2005)...