Implicit theories of criminal responsibility: Decision making and the insanity defense.

Abstract

Three questions relevant to insanity decisions were examined: (a) What informational cues are weighed most heavily in the attribution of criminal responsibility? (b) How do verdict forms influence these attributions? And (c) How do individuals' beliefs about insanity and responsibility influence decision making? Undergraduate subjects (n = 181) responded to vignettes portraying an act by a mentally disordered defendant. Psychiatric jargon was avoided, so that attributions were not a function of diagnostic terminology. It was lbund that, under the traditional scheme of not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) vs. guilty, level of mental disorder (schizophrenia vs. personality disorder) was the primary determinant of insanity decisions. Also, insanity judgments were more likely to be made for acts performed without planful intentionality. Under the alternative scheme of NGRI vs. guilty but mentally ill (GBMI) vs. guilty, mental disorder still controlled NGRI verdicts; a bizarre act increased the likelihood of a GBMI over a guilty verdict; and the GBMI verdict option reduced markedly the proportion of psychotic defendants found NGRI and the proportion of personality disordered defendants found guilty. There were no significant differences between diagnostic groups in the likelihood of being found GBMI. Most subjects preferred to utilize the GBMI option as a compromise verdict even in the face of very severe mental illness. Attitudinal data revealed considerable variation in agreement with the classic moral logic of the insanity defense and accounted for a significant amount of the variance in insanity decisions. The implications for both social policy and future research are discussed.

The effects of neuroimaging and brain injury on insanity defenses

“…For example, jurors tend to use their own construct of what insanity is rather than the legal definition, with many focusing on the defendant's ability to understand the nature of their actions (Finkel & Handel, 1989;Roberts, Golding, & Fincham, 1987;Skeem & Golding, 2001). Jurors also focus on the ability of the defendant to discern moral right from wrong (Skeem & Golding, 2001).…”

“…NGRI acquittees tend to have a diagnosis of psychosis and not personality disorder (Rice & Harris, 1990). Between 60 and 77% of all NGRI acquittees are diagnosed with a psychosis and at least 10% of these individuals have a diagnosis of organic psychosis, indicating a possible biological origin to their disorder (Cochrane, Grisso, & Frederick, 2001;Roberts et al, 1987;Warren, Murrie, Chauhan, Dietz, & Morris, 2004). In contrast, a diagnosis of a personality disorder appears to impede a successful NGRI verdict: only 9-19% of those who are successful while pleading NGRI are diagnosed with a personality disorder (Rogers & Zimbarg, 1987;Zonana, Wells, Getz, & Buchanan, 1990).…”

“…In contrast, a diagnosis of a personality disorder appears to impede a successful NGRI verdict: only 9-19% of those who are successful while pleading NGRI are diagnosed with a personality disorder (Rogers & Zimbarg, 1987;Zonana, Wells, Getz, & Buchanan, 1990). Finally, student mock jurors are also more likely to find defendants with schizophrenia NGRI than defendants with personality disorders (Roberts et al, 1987).…”

How Quick Decisions Illuminate Moral Character

“…Roberts, Golding, and Fincham (1987) report that the degree of planfulness in committing a crime led to harsher verdicts. But does quickness not reflect decreased planfulness?…”

Guilty, not guilty, or …? multiple options in jury verdict choices

“…Empirical research investigating the role of lesser charge verdicts in insanity murder trials suggests that the inclusion of GBMI or DR significantly alters verdict choice patterns (Finkel & Duff, 1989;Roberts, Golding, & Fincham, 1987). Finkel and Duff (1989) challenged the widespread view that the GBMI verdict allows juries to avoid the difficult moral issues associated with a definitive guilt determination in insanity cases (cf.…”