Impure altruism in dictators' giving

Abstract

Abstract:We design an experiment to test whether incomplete crowding out in dictator games can be rationalized by the impurely altruistic preferences. By giving the recipients an endowment of varying levels, we create an environment in which crowding out may occur. We find that the behavior of 66 percent of the dictators can be rationalized by the impurely altruistic utility function.Keywords: Dictator Game, Impure Altruism, Incomplete Crowding Out JEL Classifications: C91, D01, D64, H30, H41 * We would like to thank Asen Ivanov for patience and many helpful comments and insights. We would also like to thank Rachel Croson, Doug Davis, Catherine

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