In Defence of a Minimal Conception of Epistemic Contextualism: A Reply to M. D. Ashfield’s Response

On the Knowability of Epistemic Contextualism: A Reply to M. Montminy and W. Skolits

“…As (KP) states the necessary and sufficient conditions for the knowability problem to arise, there remains only a single question to be answered: Does epistemic contextualism meet condition (KP)? As I have argued in my 2011, 2012, 2013a and 2013b, (MEC) is close to a faithful rendering of the generic form of epistemic contextualism (assuming it to focus on the two standards H and L; 𝔖 is the set of subjects): 11 (MEC) ∃s∈𝔖 ∃p∈𝔓: ◊(K L (s, p) ∧ ¬K H (s, p)).…”

“…My own response (2011, 2012, 2013b) takes a radically different course. I deny that (1) and (2) are contextualist theses in the first place.…”

“…But it should be noted that, even if (MEC) is too weak, (KP) allows for plenty of stronger positions, such as theory(5), which give a proper contextualist answer to scepticism as Dinges conceives it, but which are still able to evade the knowability problem. See also my discussions in Freitag (2011, 2013b).…”

Defending the Coherence of Contextualism

“…10See Ashfield (2013) for some objections against MEC, and Freitag (2013) for replies. Our own objections differ from Ashfield's.…”

“…9However, Freitag remarks, ‘I consider it to be an interesting question whether the impossibility of knowledgeably H stating a theory also undermines its tenability’ (2013: 130). In section 3, we will argue for a negative answer to this question.…”