In Defence of Spatially Related Universals

Gilmore, Cody

doi:10.1080/713659709

Cited by 19 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…Many philosophers do not deny collocated entities. For example, Gilmore (2003) suggests that non-platonistic universals can be spatially collocated entities, collocated where a physical object is located. Along the same lines, Casati and Varzi discuss many candidates for collocated entities:…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 98%

The Impossibility of Relations Between Non-Collocated Spatial Objects And Non-Identical Topological Spaces

Grupp¹

2005

Axiomathes

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I argue that relations between non-collocated spatial entities, between non-identical topological spaces, and between non-identical basic building blocks of space, do not exist. If any spatially located entities are not at the same spatial location, or if any topological spaces or basic building blocks of space are nonidentical, I will argue that there are no relations between or among them. The arguments I present are arguments that I have not seen in the literature.Axiomathes (2005) 15: 85-141 Ó Springer 2005

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 98%

The Impossibility of Relations Between Non-Collocated Spatial Objects And Non-Identical Topological Spaces

Grupp¹

2005

Axiomathes

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“…Notice that immanentism claims that universals are present in space by being located at regions thereof, but it does not yet specify in which way universals are located at several regions theoreof. It does not claim, for example, that they are multi-located, because have an exact location for each place where they are instantiated (Gilmore, 2003), or that they are extended, scattered, entities that are singly located at the union of the location of their instances (Effingham, 2015). On the other hand, transcendentism denies both options, because it denies that universals are located in space at all.…”

Section: Transcendentism: the Analogy With Universalsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In fact, when an entity is multilocated at regions r and r', it will be at a zero distance from itself but also at a non-zero -basically the distance n that divides r and r' -distance from itself (Ehring, 2002;Gilmore, 2003).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Transcendentist Theory of Persistence

Costa¹

2017

Journal of Philosophy

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“…(Sermon 277, emphasis mine) Again, for Augustine the contrast here is between (a) material objects that are (i) mereologically complex, (ii) wholly located at a single place (i.e. not strongly multi-located), (iii) cannot exist without being located at some place or other, and (iv) are partly located at distinct places; and (b) God as an immaterial entity that (i) is mereologically simple, (ii) is wholly located at every place, (iii) can exist without being located at a place (say, 23 Where the notion of dependence here, I take it, is most charitably read as generic dependence. While the existence of a material object necessitates the existence of some place or other, it need not necessitate the existence of the place it presently occupies (or else it couldn't change location without thereby ceasing to exist).…”

Section: Augustinementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Material objects are "contained" in a place in that their existence depends on their being somewhere. 23 In his own words: "take from bodies their places and they will be nowhere, and because they will be nowhere they will not exist." By contrast, God "is not contained by those things to which he is present, as if he could not exist without them" (Letter 187, 6.18).…”

Section: Augustinementioning

confidence: 99%

Omnipresence and the Location of the Immaterial

Inman¹

2017

Oxford Scholarship Online

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I first offer a broad taxonomy of models of divine omnipresence in the Christian tradition, both past and present. I then examine the recent model proposed by Hud Hudson (2009Hudson ( , 2014 and Alexander Pruss (2013)-ubiquitous entension-and flag a worry with their account that stems from predominant analyses of the concept of 'material object'. I then attempt to show that ubiquitous entension has a rich Latin medieval precedent in the work of Augusine and Anselm. I argue that the model of omnipresence explicated by Augustine and Anselm has the resources to avoid the noted worry by offering an alternative account of the divide between the immaterial and the material. I conclude by considering a few alternative analyses of 'material object' that make conceptual room for a contemporary Christian theist to follow suite in thinking that at least some immaterial entities are literally spatially located when relating to the denizens of spacetime.At the heart of many a theistic metaphysic is the view that an exhaustive inventory of reality consists of both material and immaterial entities, and that these two domains interact in some way or other. There is, however, surprisingly little discussion at the intersection of contemporary metaphysics and philosophical theology concerning the precise nature and relationship between the material and the immaterial and its bearing on Christian theology.This was not always the case. Medieval philosophical reflection was replete with discussion on the nature of the relationship between God, angels, and the human soul and the material domain. In fact, according to Robert Pasnau (2011a), the medieval scholastics were largely in agreement that immaterial entities, though lacking in material content are, strictly speaking, spatially located or present in some sense or other when relating to material reality. The question that preoccupied medieval philosophical theologians, then, was not whether such entities were spatially located or present in their dealings with material beings, but rather, how they were located as such. This, of course, assumes an understanding of the material-immaterial divide that is largely foreign to the contemporary context. Yet it is one that is both philosophically interesting, theologically fruitful, and by my lights worthy of serious consideration once again. * For a representative writing sample please consult the introduction, §2, and §4.

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In Defence of Spatially Related Universals

Cited by 19 publications

References 5 publications

The Impossibility of Relations Between Non-Collocated Spatial Objects And Non-Identical Topological Spaces

The Impossibility of Relations Between Non-Collocated Spatial Objects And Non-Identical Topological Spaces

The Transcendentist Theory of Persistence

Omnipresence and the Location of the Immaterial

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