2009
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1407731
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In Defense of Data: Information and the Costs of Privacy

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Cited by 13 publications
(8 citation statements)
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“…Privacy regulation can affect the nature and distribution of economic outcomes (Goldfarb and Tucker 2012a). Edelman (2009) and Lenard and Rubin (2009) emphasize that there is a trade-off between the use of online customer data to subsidize zero-price goods and advertising performance. Goldfarb and Tucker (2011d) show that European privacy regulation that restricted online tracking led to a substantial decline in the effectiveness of online advertising in Europe.…”
Section: How Do Digital Markets Affect Privacymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Privacy regulation can affect the nature and distribution of economic outcomes (Goldfarb and Tucker 2012a). Edelman (2009) and Lenard and Rubin (2009) emphasize that there is a trade-off between the use of online customer data to subsidize zero-price goods and advertising performance. Goldfarb and Tucker (2011d) show that European privacy regulation that restricted online tracking led to a substantial decline in the effectiveness of online advertising in Europe.…”
Section: How Do Digital Markets Affect Privacymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Consequences.-However, such regulation will impose costs. As set out by Evans (2009) and Lenard and Rubin (2009), there is a trade-off between the use of online customer data and the effectiveness of advertising.…”
Section: A Online Advertisingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As a starting point, a number of privacy advocates have argued that, in order for individuals to be able to maintain the appropriate degree of control over how digital platforms aggregate, share, and monetize their data, users of these platforms must be afforded legitimate property rights over their personal data (see, e.g., Bergelson, ; Feld, ). Others, however, have argued that such an approach is too simplistic, and ignores important complexities and benefits associated with the markets that have developed around aggregations of user data (see, e.g., Evans, ; Lenard & Rubin, ; Purtova, ; Schwartz, ; Spiekermann‐Hoff, Acquisti, & Hui, ; Tene & Polonetsky, , ; Tisne, ). For this reason, it has been argued that “the dichotomy ‘property in personal data’ vs ‘no property in personal data’ … is false” (Purtova, , p. 84).…”
Section: Privacy and The Contested State Of User Datamentioning
confidence: 99%