In Search of the Average Transnational Terrorist Attack Venue

Δράκος, Κωνσταντίνος; Gofas, Andreas

doi:10.1080/10242690500445387

Cited by 116 publications

(110 citation statements)

References 28 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

102

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Emphasis is laid on stable autocracies because terrorism cannot be controlled by failing and failed states (Lai 2007;Piazza 2008a). This narrative is in accordance with Schmid (1992); Eubank and Weinberg (1994); Drakos and Gofas (2006) and Piazza (2007). On the contrary, theories of political access (Eyerman 1998) posit that good governance and strong democracies should be comparatively more immune to terrorism relative to non-democracies.…”

Section: Theoretical Underpinningssupporting

confidence: 62%

“…This includes both theoretical (Schmid 1992;Eubank and Weinberg 1994;Drakos and Gofas 2006;Piazza 2007) and empirical Weinberg 1994, 2001;Weinberg and Eubank 1998;Piazza 2007Piazza , 2008bChenoweth 2010) literatures. On the other hand, the findings accord with the stream of literature on the positive rewards of governance in mitigating terrorism activities, namely: theories of political access (Eyerman 1998) and empirical literature from perspectives of the rule of law (Choi 2010) and independence of the judiciary (Findley and Young 2011).…”

Section: 1 Nexus With the Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Fighting terrorism in Africa: evidence from bundling and unbundling institutions

et al. 2017

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This study assesses government mechanisms in the fight against terrorism with particular emphasis on the bundling and unbundling of ten governance dynamics. The empirical evidence is based on a panel of 53 African countries for period 1998-2012 and GeneralizedMethod of Moments. The following findings are established. First, for the most part, political governance and its constituents respectively have negative effects on all terrorism dynamics, with the following consistent increasing order of negative magnitude: unclear terrorism, transnational terrorism, domestic terrorism and total terrorism. Second, overwhelmingly for economic and institutional governances, the governance dynamics and their constituent components affect terrorism negatively, with the magnitude on domestic terrorism consistently higher than that on transnational terrorism. Third, for most specifications, the effect of general governance is consistently negative on terrorism variables.Theoretical and practical policy implications are discussed.

show abstract

Section: Theoretical Underpinningssupporting

confidence: 62%

Section: 1 Nexus With the Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Fighting terrorism in Africa: evidence from bundling and unbundling institutions

et al. 2017

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…31 Audience 21. See, for example, Drakos and Gofas 2006;Lai 2007;Piazza 2007Piazza , 2008San-Akca 2014;and Savun and Phillips 2009. 22.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regime Types and Terrorism

Gaibulloev¹,

Piazza²,

Sandler³

2017

Int Org

116

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Regime type has opposing effects on terrorism. If a regime constrains the executive branch, then terrorism may be more prevalent. If, however, a regime allows all viewpoints to be represented, then grievances may be held in check, resulting in less terrorism. Regimes that value constituents' lives and property will also act to limit attacks. We formulate a game-theoretic model, containing a terrorist group and targeted government, that captures these opposing forces and supports a nonlinear relationship between regime type and terrorism. This model indicates how diverse samples in the literature can result in different relationships between regime type and terrorism. Seldom does it support the positive relationship that is prevalent in the terrorism literature. We apply a large variety of empirical techniques to show that regime type has a robust inverted U-shaped impact on various terrorism measures. Foreign policy variables (e.g., alliance with the United States) are not a robust influence on terrorism.

show abstract

“…While the above sections summarized counter-terrorism strategies that target the "permissive factors" (Drakos and Gofas 2006b), this section will discuss approaches that aim at eradicating the actual grievances on which terrorist actions are built, thus undermining terrorist legitimacy (e.g., recruitment, financing, popular support). In general, related strategies are linked to an increase in the opportunity costs of violence (Frey and Luechinger 2008).…”

Section: Targeting Root Causes Of Terrorismmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Economics of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: A Survey (Part II)

2010

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Economics of Security Working Paper SeriesEconomics of Security is an initiative managed by DIW Berlin AbstractThis survey provides an in-depth analysis of existing research on the economic analysis of terrorism and counter-terrorist measures. First the existing evidence on the causes of terrorism is analyzed, then we consider the evidence of the consequences of terrorism and we demonstrate why it is important to regarding of the issue of counter-terrorism policy. Moreover the survey presents the existing knowledge on the interrelation between the economy and the issue of security and it incorporates analysis the level of knowledge about the causal chains between security and the economy. Also it focuses on perspective and methodologies from the discipline of economics but also refers to research from related disciplines (sociology, political science). It also assembles the knowledge on the impact of terrorism on the economy as reflected in macro-economic variables and its impact on specific sectors. Furthermore it assesses how potential an actual terrorist event determine consumer and producer behaviour, public policy, as well as terrorist responses to these policies. Finally a European perspective on the terrorism security annexes is discussed and here we analyze the causes of terrorism in Europe.JEL-Code: K42, H56, O17.Keywords: risk, insecurity, survey, terrorism, counter-terrorism, security economics This paper consists of two parts. Part I comprises chapters 1 to 4 and part II comprises chapters 5 to 9 -including the references.

show abstract

In Search of the Average Transnational Terrorist Attack Venue

Cited by 116 publications

References 28 publications

Fighting terrorism in Africa: evidence from bundling and unbundling institutions

Fighting terrorism in Africa: evidence from bundling and unbundling institutions

Regime Types and Terrorism

The Economics of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: A Survey (Part II)

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About