2016
DOI: 10.1089/elj.2016.0365
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In the Shadows of Sunlight: The Effects of Transparency on State Political Campaigns

Abstract: In recent years, the courts have invalidated a variety of campaign finance laws while simultaneously upholding disclosure requirements. Courts view disclosure as a less-restrictive means to root out corruption while critics claim that disclosure chills speech and deters political participation. Using individual-level contribution data from state elections between 2000 and 2008, we find that the speech-chilling effects of disclosure are negligible. On average, less than one donor per candidate is likely to stop… Show more

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Cited by 18 publications
(11 citation statements)
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References 32 publications
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“…A longer simulation would allow for the inclusion of a voter element such that hypothesized benefits of disclosure could be measured and discussed with students, particularly in relation to the types of costs discussed previously. It also could make possible original research to contribute additional findings to a current and important discussion/debate about disclosure requirements (Carpenter et al 2014;Carpenter andMilyo 2012-2013;Gilbert and Aiken 2015;Mayer 2014;Wood and Spencer 2016).…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…A longer simulation would allow for the inclusion of a voter element such that hypothesized benefits of disclosure could be measured and discussed with students, particularly in relation to the types of costs discussed previously. It also could make possible original research to contribute additional findings to a current and important discussion/debate about disclosure requirements (Carpenter et al 2014;Carpenter andMilyo 2012-2013;Gilbert and Aiken 2015;Mayer 2014;Wood and Spencer 2016).…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Campaign finance, of course, is a large and debated topic, spanning candidate and ballot-issue contexts; recent US Supreme Court decisions (e.g., Citizens United v. FEC); the role of money in politics (Gaughan 2016;Gerken 2014;Krumholz 2013;Mayer 2016); and the efficacy of disclosure (Hasen 2011;Munger 2009;Primo 2013;Primo and Milyo 2006;Wood and Spencer 2016)-to name only a few. By necessity, a simulation created to be implemented within the confines of one class meeting must be narrowly focused.…”
Section: Simulating Campaign Financementioning
confidence: 99%
“…For non-voting members, we exclude editors in charge of comments and book reviews even if they are at or above the lowest voting member on the masthead.5 This measure has been validated and employed in prior research(Bonica, 2014;Thomsen, 2014;Chilton and Posner, 2015;Wood and Spencer, 2016). For example, Bonica (2017) validates CFscores against "policy preferences for a wide range of issues and successfully discriminate within party.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Whether disclosure, on net, chills or thaws speech is an open, empirical question, and the Court's assumption has so far been tested only rarely. See, e.g.,Wood & Spencer 2016, La Raja 2014 In the language of Michael Gilbert, disclosure probably thaws some speech. Some thawing results from disclosure revealing cross pressures on the candidates and candidates' credibility in a given policy area(Gilbert 2013).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This happens more often than one might expect: in state-level races between 2000 and 2008, 17% of all contributions that candidates and campaigns reported were below the state's mandatory threshold. Giving below the threshold is not a safe harbor from being identified(Wood & Spencer 2016).27 Of course, there are corruption-based reasons for wanting to know the more fine-grained information of the employer, so that the public can hold elected officials accountable for working to benefit donors vs. nondonors.http://law.bepress.com/usclwps-lss/254…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%