Incapacitation and just deserts as motives for punishment.

Darley, John M.; Carlsmith, Kevin M.; Robinson, Paul H.

doi:10.1023/a:1005552203727

Cited by 301 publications

(296 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…Participants were asked to assign a proper punishment to each case without any indication as to what that decision should be based upon, using a 7-point scale of punishment severity and a 13-point scale of criminal liability grades. Participants were thereafter asked to reconsider the scenarios and assign punishments from a just deserts perspective and from a incapacitation perspective (Darley, Carlsmith, & Robinson, 2000).…”

Section: Hopeless Disagreement As To Notions Of Desertmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Proper Role of Community in Determining Criminal Liability and Punishment

Robinson¹

2014

Popular Punishment

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Section: Hopeless Disagreement As To Notions Of Desertmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Proper Role of Community in Determining Criminal Liability and Punishment

Robinson¹

2014

Popular Punishment

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“…(1) Appropriateness: In the justified punishment scenario, punishers' behavior might be presented as the appropriate course of action (i.e., punishment is appropriate when people find others cheating), whereas the punishers' behavior in the unjustified punishment scenario might be presented as inappropriate (i.e., it is not appropriate, even when others cheat). (2) Proportionality: Studies on punishment conducted from the perspective of law measure the justifiability of punishments by rating the severity of the most appropriate punishment (e.g., Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002;Darley, Carlsmith & Robinson, 2000;Weiner, Graham, & Reyna, 1997)-that is, proportional punishment is regarded as justified. If this definition is accurate, the proportionality of punishment might be an important factor in people's distinction between justified punishers and unjustified punishers.…”

Section: Limitations and Future Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Comparison of Preferences of Monopolistic and Non-Monopolistic Individuals Toward Justified Punishers

Morimoto

Nakashima

Kusumi

2011

PSYCHOLOGIA -An International Journal of Psychological Sciences

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Recently, considerable attention has been paid to the reputational basis of punishment. The current study examines two issues: the justifiability of punishments and individual differences among observers. Participants evaluated the traits and likability of justified and unjustified punishers and were classified into two groups by the dictator game: monopolists and non-monopolists. As predicted, justified punishers were considered as having favorable traits and unjustified punishers were not. Additionally, we found that non-monopolistic participants regarded justified punishers as good partners, while monopolistic participants did not. Multiple regression analysis showed that this pattern cannot be explained by similarities between punishers and participants. It is likely that monopolists would avoid any punishers, due to the higher possibility that they would be targeted by punishers.

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“…In the context of punishment, moral intuitions are sometimes disconnected from the consequences of punishment, suggesting that a moral heuristic may well be at work (see Darley et al 2000). Suppose, for example, that a corporation has engaged in serious wrongdoing.…”

Section: Pointless Punishment?mentioning

confidence: 99%

what's in a heuristic?

Hahn¹,

Frost²,

Maio³

2005

Behav Brain Sci

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With respect to questions of fact, people use heuristics -mental short-cuts, or rules of thumb, that generally work well, but that also lead to systematic errors. People use moral heuristics too -moral short-cuts, or rules of thumb, that lead to mistaken and even absurd moral judgments. These judgments are highly relevant not only to morality, but to law and politics as well. Examples are given from a number of domains, including risk regulation, punishment, reproduction and sexuality, and the act/omission distinction. In all of these contexts, rapid, intuitive judgments make a great deal of sense, but sometimes produce moral mistakes that are replicated in law and policy. One implication is that moral assessments ought not to be made by appealing to intuitions about exotic cases and problems; those intuitions are particularly unlikely to be reliable. Another implication is that some deeply held moral judgments are unsound if they are products of moral heuristics. The idea of error-prone heuristics is especially controversial in the moral domain, where agreement on the correct answer may be hard to elicit; but in many contexts, heuristics are at work and they do real damage. Moral framing effects, including those in the context of obligations to future generations, are also discussed.Cass R. Sunstein is Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, Law School and Department of Political Science, University of Chicago. His many books include Laws of Fear (2005), Why Societies Need Dissent (2003), and Risk and Reason (2002). Much of his research explores the intersection of psychology, economics, and law; he has been particularly interested in the role of cognitive errors and social influences on juries, legislators, judges, and those who are the objects of law's commands. He is now working on a book on the production of social knowledge, with special reference to information aggregation across persons.that some of our deeply held moral beliefs might be products of heuristics that sometimes produce mistakes.If moral heuristics are in fact pervasive, then people with diverse foundational commitments should be able to agree, not that their own preferred theories are wrong, but that they are often applied in a way that reflects the use of heuristics. Utilitarians ought to be able to identify heuristics for the maximization of utility; deontologists should be able to point to heuristics for the proper discharge of moral responsibilities; and those uncommitted to any large-scale theory should be able to specify heuristics for their own more modest normative commitments. And if moral heuristics exist, blunders are highly likely not only in moral thinking, but in legal and political practice as well. Conventional legal and political arguments are often a product of heuristics masquerading as universal truths. Hence, I will identify a set of political and legal judgments that are best understood as a product of heuristics, and that are often taken, wrongly and damagingly, as a guide to political and legal p...

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Incapacitation and just deserts as motives for punishment.

Cited by 301 publications

References 21 publications

The Proper Role of Community in Determining Criminal Liability and Punishment

The Proper Role of Community in Determining Criminal Liability and Punishment

Comparison of Preferences of Monopolistic and Non-Monopolistic Individuals Toward Justified Punishers

what's in a heuristic?

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