Incentive/Disincentive Provisions in Highway Contracts

Arditi, David; Khisty, C. Jotin; Yasamis, Firuzan

doi:10.1061/(asce)0733-9364(1997)123:3(302)

Cited by 52 publications

(32 citation statements)

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“…This can be seen from using a time disincentive but lacking a time incentive in the National Museum of Australia Project illustrated by Walker et al (2002). On the other hand, it is possible to combine disincentives with incentives (Arditi et al 1997;Bubshait 2003). The combination of both can be used in any performance areas, such as time, cost, quality, safety and environment.…”

Section: Incentives or Disincentivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…According to Bubshait (2003), the majority of clients of industrial projects, such as petro-chemical projects and power projects, in Saudi Arabia would assign incentives and disincentives equally or sometimes incline to disincentives, whereas the majority of contractors would expect more incentives than disincentives. Based on the investigation of highway projects in the United States, Arditi et al (1997) found that disincentives were generally larger in amount and accompanied incentives.…”

Section: Incentives or Disincentivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As a result of incentivization, the contractor works quicker, cheaper and better and therefore there is a greater certainty of delivering the client's desired performance (Hughes et al 2007). The client may expect the project to be completed in the shortest possible time, at the lowest possible cost and with the best possible quality (Arditi et al 1997). In this case, incentivizing the contractor's performance is an inevitable choice.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Robust Optimization for the Discrete Time-Cost Tradeoff Problem with Cost Uncertainty

Hazır

Haouari

Erel

2014

Handbook on Project Management and Scheduling Vol. 2

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This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. Exempted from this legal reservation are brief excerpts in connection with reviews or scholarly analysis or material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. Duplication of this publication or parts thereof is permitted only under the provisions of the Copyright Law of the Publisher's location, in its current version, and permission for use must always be obtained from Springer. Permissions for use may be obtained through RightsLink at the Copyright Clearance Center. Violations are liable to prosecution under the respective Copyright Law. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. While the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication, neither the authors nor the editors nor the publisher can accept any legal responsibility for any errors or omissions that may be made. The publisher makes no warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein.Printed on acid-free paper Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com) PrefaceThis handbook is devoted to scientific approaches to the management and scheduling of projects. Due to their practical relevance, project management and scheduling have been important subjects of inquiry since the early days of Management Science and Operations Research and remain an active and vibrant field of study. The handbook is meant to provide an overview of some of the most active current areas of research. Each chapter has been written by well-recognized scholars, who have made original contributions to their topic. The handbook covers both theoretical concepts and a wide range of applications. For our general readers, we give a brief introduction to elements of project management and scheduling in the first chapter, where we also survey the contents of this book. We believe that the handbook will be a valuable and comprehensive reference to researchers and practitioners in project management and scheduling and hope that it might stimulate further research in this exciting and practically important field.Short-listing and selecting the contributions to this handbook and working with more than one hundred authors have been a challenging and rewarding experience for us. We are grateful to Günter Sch...

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Section: Incentives or Disincentivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Incentives or Disincentivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Robust Optimization for the Discrete Time-Cost Tradeoff Problem with Cost Uncertainty

Hazır

Haouari

Erel

2014

Handbook on Project Management and Scheduling Vol. 2

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“…1 At one extreme, regulators can eliminate all scope for discretion by imposing the obligation to immediately undertake the investment required to provide the service. At the other, contracts can be designed so as to leave a large degree of autonomy to the franchisee, by simply assigning the right, as distinct from the obligation, to supply the market.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…These arrangements constitute a continuum, along which we find concessions which impose service obligations but give the franchisee a certain amount of time flexibility, and contracts which do not impose the obligation to supply the market, but the licensee has a limited amount of time to start using the licence after which it will be revoked. 2 Whatever the terms and conditions specified in the contract, a concession can be granted essentially in three ways: direct negotiations, beauty contests, 1 Although service rollout time limits are often imposed, particularly when concessioning "socially significant services", such as the provision of potable water, governments also award contracts which do not impose stringent obligations. This, for example, has occured in Europe when awarding 3G telecom (UMTS) licences.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Auctioning Monopoly Franchises: Award Criteria and Service Launch Requirements

Moretto

Dosi

2009

SSRN Journal

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SummaryWe study the competition to acquire the exclusive right to operate an infrastructure service, by comparing two different specifications for the financial proposals -"lowest price to consumers" vs "highest concession fee", and two alternative contractual arrangements: a contract which imposes the obligation to immediately undertake the investment required to operate the concessioned service and a contract which simply assigns to the winning bidder the right to supply the market at a date of her choosing. By comparing the returns of these alternative award criteria and concessioning conditions, we show that concessioning without imposing rollout time limits may or may not provide a higher expected social value, depending on the bidding rule used to allocate the contract. In turn, the relative advantages of each award criterion are affected by the concessioning conditions. Keywords AbstractWe study the competition to acquire the exclusive right to operate an infrastructure service, by comparing two different specifications for the financial proposals -"lowest price to consumers" v s "highest concession fee", and two alternative contractual arrangements: a contract which imposes the obligation to immediately undertake the investment required to operate the concessioned service and a contract which simply assigns to the winning bidder the right to supply the market at a date of her choosing. By comparing the returns of these alternative award criteria and concessioning conditions, we show that concessioning without imposing rollout time limits may or may not provide a higher expected social value, depending on the bidding rule used to allocate the contract. In turn, the relative advantages of each award criterion are affected by the concessioning conditions.

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Incentive Mechanisms and Their Impact on Project Performance

Meng

2014

Handbook on Project Management and Scheduling Vol. 2

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Incentive/Disincentive Provisions in Highway Contracts

Cited by 52 publications

References 0 publications

Robust Optimization for the Discrete Time-Cost Tradeoff Problem with Cost Uncertainty

Robust Optimization for the Discrete Time-Cost Tradeoff Problem with Cost Uncertainty

Auctioning Monopoly Franchises: Award Criteria and Service Launch Requirements

Incentive Mechanisms and Their Impact on Project Performance

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