Incentive Effects in Tournaments with Heterogeneous Competitors – an Analysis of the Olympic Rowing Regatta in Sydney 2000

Abstract

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Intermediate Information, Loss Aversion, and Effort: Empirical Evidence

“…Their gamelevel analysis suggests that ex ante heterogeneity significantly reduces both teams' effort levels. Bach, Gürtler, and Prinz (2009) confirm these results with an analysis of Olympic rowing regattas, showing that more capable oarspeople row faster when the heterogeneity of the starting field decreases, and underdogs always provide the most effort.…”

The Impact of Intermediate Information on Sabotage in Tournaments with Heterogeneous Contestants

“…Various empirical studies investigate effects of different tournament designs on contestants' effort, especially in the field of sports (e.g., Bach et al, 2009;Becker and Huselid, 1992;Ehrenberg and Bognanno, 1990a;Ehrenberg and Bognanno, 1990b;Frick and Prinz, 2007;Lallemand et al, 2008;Lynch, 2005;Lynch and Zax, 2000;Orszag, 1994;Sunde, 2009;Taylor and Trogdon, 2002). However, few empirical studies focus on contestants' decisions about the amount of risk or sabotage to undertake.…”

Pecuniary incentive in tournaments and effects of players’ heterogeneity on efforts in the association of tennis professionals

“…As a result, overall performance and, hence, the intensity of the tournament decrease. This effect is referred to as the contamination hypothesis (Norbert Bach, Oliver Gürtler, and Joachim Prinz 2009;Gürtler and Matthias Kräkel 2010).…”

“…Because contestants are seldom completely homogeneous in practice, this prediction calls the frequent use and effectiveness of tournament schemes in firms and organization into question. Although the heterogeneous tournaments have been studied in the theoretical literature (see Kräkel and Dirk Sliwka 2004) and experimental studies (see Clive Bull, Andrew Schotter, and Keith Weigelt 1987;Schotter and Weigelt 1992), only recently, a growing body of articles test the theoretical predictions with non-experimental field data from sports contests (see Bach, Gürtler, and Prinz 2009).…”

“…This article investigates whether tournaments between heterogeneous contestants are less intense. In this article, a theoretical model based on Edward Lazear and Sherwin Rosen (1981) and Kräkel and Sliwka (2004) is used to explain the contamination hypothesis (Bach, Gürtler, and Prinz 2009). To empirically test the hypothesis, professional tennis data from the Association of Tennis Professionals (ATP) were used.…”