Income distribution, government transfers, and the problem of unequal influence

Bassett, William F.; Burkett, John P.; Putterman, Louis

doi:10.1016/s0176-2680(99)00004-x

Cited by 85 publications

(71 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…Perotti (1996) analyzes a broad dataset including the marginal tax rate and di erent expenditure components, and he concludes that there is little evidence of a negative association between equality and ÿscal variables. Bassett et al (1999) reach the same conclusion with other deÿnitions of transfers and spending. Milanovic (2000) has a more direct measure of redistribution, the income gain of di erent income groups from factor income to disposable income.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 80%

Income distribution and tax structure: Empirical test of the Meltzer–Richard hypothesis

Borge

2004

European Economic Review

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 80%

Income distribution and tax structure: Empirical test of the Meltzer–Richard hypothesis

Borge

2004

European Economic Review

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“…Milanovic (1999) found that there is indeed more redistribution going towards the poorer segments of the society, though not necessarily through the median voter mechanism. He speculates that there are three reasons for his findings: (i) level of the decisive voter, in the income distribution, is much lower than the median, which apparently is contrary to the latest findings (Bassett et al 1999); (ii) there may be some long-term gains from redistributive policies, which the middle class is expecting (for example, the middle class may not be benefiting from unemployment benefits now, but they may do so in the long run); (iii) another mechanism through which the redistribution takes place may have to be defined. Stemming from results of the study by Milanovic (1999), it could be argued that poorer segments of society may not always push for higher taxation, leaving open the possibility for less than egalitarian democracies (e.g.…”

Section: Causal Mechanisms Of the Democracy-inequality Nexuscontrasting

confidence: 67%

Democracy and income inequality: revisiting the long- and short-term relationship

Nikoloski¹

2015

Review of Economics and Institutions

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This paper studies the relationship between democracy and income inequality in long--and short/medium--run. Using appropriate econometric techniques on both, averaged and panel data for the period 1962--2006, we find no evidence that democracy is associated with tighter income distribution. Our results are robust to different specification techniques, to exclusion of developed as well as the transition countries. We speculate that different (and opposing) transmission mechanisms, as well as the nature and the definition of the democracy variable (both Polity IV and Freedom House) influence our results. Improvement of conceptualization and measurement of democracy could shed further light onto the democracy--inequality nexus.

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“…To lower the financial burden through redistribution, top incomes might engage in rent-seeking behavior. Some studies (Scervini, 2012 andBassett et al, 1999) state that de facto political power may be above the median, as higher income levels devote additional resources towards campaign contributions. Additionally, Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) show that political participation increases with income and education.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Determinants of governmental redistribution: Income distribution, development levels, and the role of perceptions

Gründler

Köllner

2017

Journal of Comparative Economics

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We empirically investigate the relationship between income inequality and redistribution, accounting for the shape of the income distribution, different development levels, and subjective perceptions. Cross-national inequality datasets that have become available only recently allow for the assessment of the link for various sample compositions and several model specifications. Our results confirm the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis, but suggest that the relation between market inequality and redistribution is even stronger when using perceived inequality measures. The findings emphasize a decisive role of the middle class, though also approving a negative impact of top incomes. The Meltzer-Richard effect is less pronounced in developing economies with less sophisticated political rights, illustrating that it is the political channel through which higher inequality translates into more redistribution. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

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Income distribution, government transfers, and the problem of unequal influence

Cited by 85 publications

References 9 publications

Income distribution and tax structure: Empirical test of the Meltzer–Richard hypothesis

Income distribution and tax structure: Empirical test of the Meltzer–Richard hypothesis

Democracy and income inequality: revisiting the long- and short-term relationship

Determinants of governmental redistribution: Income distribution, development levels, and the role of perceptions

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