Inconsistency effects in source memory and compensatory schema-consistent guessing

Abstract

The attention-elaboration hypothesis of memory for schematically unexpected information predicts better source memory for unexpected than expected sources. In three source-monitoring experiments, the authors tested the occurrence of an inconsistency effect in source memory. Participants were presented with items that were schematically either very expected or very unexpected for their source. Multinomial processing tree models were used to separate source memory, item memory, and guessing bias. Results show an inconsistency effect in source memory accompanied by a compensatory schema-consistent guessing bias when expectancy strength is high, that is, when items are very expected or very unexpected for their source.

Remembering the place with the tiger: Survival processing can enhance source memory

“…Although congruity has been shown to have beneficial effects on free recall (Butler, Kang, & Roediger, 2009), it is unlikely the only candidate for explaining the source memory advantage observed here. Congruity has beneficial effects on source monitoring (Bell, Mieth, et al, 2015;Kuhlmann, Vaterrodt, & Bayen, 2012;Küppers & Bayen, 2014), but these are entirely due to source guessing, while source memory is often enhanced for incongruent material. For instance, when presenting congruent and incongruent objects (e.g., Btoothbrush^or Boven^) in either a kitchen or bathroom context, participants have a strong tendency toward guessing that the objects (e.g., Btoothbrush^) were encountered in a congruent context (e.g., Bbathroom^), but source memory (adjusted for guessing) is either unaffected by congruence or even better for the incongruent items (Küppers & Bayen, 2014).…”

“…A survival advantage was detected: source memory for the survival scenario was better than source memory for the moving scenario, ΔG 2 (1) = 9.98, p = .002 (i.e., the restriction d Survival = d Moving was incompatible with the data). Guessing parameter g corresponded to .41, which means that participants had a tendency to guess that an item whose source was not remembered was encoded in the moving scenario, ΔG 2 (1) = 7.27, p = .007, which could be due to a compensatory guessing strategy (Küppers & Bayen, 2014).…”

Human (In)Consistencies in Ian McEwan’s Amsterdam

“…Küppers and Bayen (2014:2043-2044 make the difference between schema-consistent information and schema-inconsistent information, which are less well and respectively better remembered. In their analysis, founded on the research of Gawronski et al (2003) and of Stangor and McMillan (1992), they share the idea of this "connection between expectancy strength and the occurrence of inconsistency effects."…”

“…However, they also agreed on the fact that stronger stereotypical beliefs lead to "better memory for inconsistent stereotypes", while "weaker stereotypical beliefs [show] no difference in memory". (Küppers and Bayen 2014:2043-2044 Human inconsistency also depends on time and space. Starting from psychologists' and economists' conclusion that people generally are inconsistent at different times, Prince and Shawhan demonstrate that men are more often inconsistent than women are, and therefore show a tendency towards procrastination and making choices "with long term costs or risks against their own prior wishes" (Prince and Shawhan 2011:501).…”

“…[He imagines a scene in which he saves the woman and they leave Although less usual experiences, which may be considered 'schema-inconsistent information', are expected to be well remembered, Clive fails to remember the face of the man who raped the woman when he is taken to the police. This ranges him among people with "weaker stereotypical beliefs" (Küppers andBayen 2014:2044). The solution he found to his brief conflict of whether to help the woman or not shows his selfishness.…”