Incredible Worlds, Credible Results

Abstract

Robert Sugden argues that robustness analysis cannot play an epistemic role in grounding model-world relationships because the procedure is only a matter of comparing models with each other. We posit that this argument is based on a view of models as being surrogate systems in too literal a sense. In contrast, the epistemic importance of robustness analysis is easy to explicate if modelling is viewed as extended cognition, as inference from assumptions to conclusions. Robustness analysis is about assessing the reliability of our extended inferences, and when our confidence in these inferences changes, so does our confidence in the results. Furthermore, we argue that Sugden's inductive account relies tacitly on robustness considerations.

Derivational Robustness and Indirect Confirmation

“…For example, writing M1 = (A1&A2&A3)├ R means that assumptions A1, A2, and A3 are being used to derive result R from model M1. Although accounts that emphasise the importance of inferential issues in modelling would be particularly suitable (Suárez 2004;Kuorikoski and Lehtinen 2009), this way of presenting modelling inferences does not imply a commitment to any specific interpretation of what models are. As a matter of fact, it would be possible to remove the symbols indicating models (M1, M2 etc.)…”

Understanding with theoretical models

“…How could it be explanatory despite its seeming dissimilarity to everything we know about the formation of ethnically segregated neighborhoods? Recently, a number of philosophers of economics have tried to answer these questions (Cartwright 2009;de Donato and Zamora-Bonilla 2009;Grüne-Yanoff 2009;Knuuttila 2009;Kuorikoski and Lehtinen 2009;Mäki 2009;Sugden 2009). These papers mostly focus on the relation between a model (e.g., the checkerboard model) and its supposed target.…”

External representations and scientific understanding

“…What matters is the ability to use it to make correct what--if inferences about the object of interest. When the inferences from the assumptions to the explanandum are accomplished with the aid of an external medium (such as pen and paper, computer, or a checkerboard), and a set of formal truth--preserving inferential rules, the relevant cognitive system is not the modeler alone, but the model--modeler pair (Kuorikoski and Lehtinen 2009). This makes the extended cognitive system composed of the modeler and the external inferential apparatus the understanding subject, whose inferential performance is constitutive of understanding.…”

“…Finally, we apply our theory of the 1 This should not be taken as a stance in the ontology of models discussion. We do not deny that it makes sense to abstract away from the concrete instantiations of these artifacts to their inferential properties and define the identity in these terms (see Kuorikoski and Lehtinen 2009). dimensions of explanatory power to model--based explanations. We aim to present an overall perspective on model--based understanding, and for this reason we cannot provide a detailed exposition of all aspects of our account.…”

“…In this paper we show how these challenges can be met with an inferential conception of understanding. The basic elements of our account have been developed in some of our earlier papers (Kuorikoski 2011, Kuorikoski & Lehtinen 2009, Ylikoski 2013, 2014, Ylikoski & Aydinonat 2014, but this paper brings these ideas together and expands them into a systematic account of model--based explanation. We argue that approaching model--based reasoning as extended cognition and adopting an inferentialist analysis of representation dissolves both of the two central questions, and shows that the sense of paradox associated with model--based explanations arises from faulty philosophical assumptions.…”